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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Over the past decade there has been significant progress in expanding borrowers' 
access to capital for homeownership and other activities. "However, gains have been offset 
by an increase in predatory lending practices, particularly in the home mortgage market" 
(Knowledgeplex). Predatory lending has become a serious problem for many homeowners 
and potential homeowners in the United States. As the name suggests predatory lending 
preys on those considered to be weak. According to Davis (2000), predatory lending is a 
combination of unfair or abusive loan terms, unscrupulous and misleading marketing, and 
high pressure lending tactics that limit information or choices available to a consumer. 
Predatory lenders promise lower monthly payments as a way out of debt. These 
lenders seem to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages. "Worse yet, the 
homeowners will be entering a system that promotes a cycle of debt that has been compared 
to sharecropping, an economic system that is unequal and unfair" (Bradley & Skillem, 2000, 
p. 3). The positives are accentuated because it is a win-win situation for the lenders. When 
the borrower makes the monthly mortgage payment a profit is made. Also, if the borrower 
cannot make the monthly payments then the lender can foreclose, sell the house, and make an 
even larger profit. The borrower loses money, equity in the home, and ultimately he/she can 
lose the home. 
Predatory lending is known as reverse redlining (Reverse redlining, 1993). Redlining 
refers to a practice in which the extension of credit is limited in targeted areas usually 
minority or low-income neighborhoods. Reverse redlining refers to specifically targeting 
those neighborhoods to extend loans with predatory characteristics. 
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Predatory lending is sometimes used synonymously with subprime lending. However, 
all subprime lending is not predatory lending. In the past several years mortgage lenders have 
been originating what has become known as subprime loans. Subprime lending extends 
credit to borrowers who exhibit characteristics indicating a significant higher risk of default 
than conventional borrowers. As such subprime lending is linked to the credit status of the 
borrowers. These borrowers have had some credit problems such as late payments on bills, 
charge-offs, and bankruptcies (Rizer, 2001). 
Subprime customers typically are referred to as "B/C" credit customers as 
distinguished from "A," or "prime," customers who have excellent credit histories. However, 
subprime loans are often given to borrowers with good credit. Citizens for Community 
Improvement (CCI) of Des Moines found that 63% of the subprime loans are made to people 
eligible for prime loans. This is unethical and is considered to be a predatory practice (CRA-
NC). 
Subprime lending is a very vital part of the economy. Subprime lenders provide loans 
to borrowers who do not meet the standards, which would make them "prime" borrowers. 
"Fair subprime lenders make loans that are appropriately priced to compensate for the risk of 
lending to a credit-blemished borrower" (Citibank). Although these borrowers are charged 
more than prime borrowers they are not victims of the abusive practices that define predatory 
lending. 
The subprime market has grown dramatically. The market growth occurred between 
1993 and 1998 (Housing Ohio). There was an explosion of loans combined with the nearly 
hyper-segmentation of mortgage lending markets by race and neighborhood, which created 
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opportunities for abuse. This two-tier system has increased the opportunity for abuses within 
the market, especially targeting the less sophisticated homeowners. 
According to the Woodstock Institute (1999) there are several reasons for growth of 
subprime and predatory lending: 
• Increase in homeownership among less experienced, less sophisticated 
homeowners, 
• Increase in medical and credit card debt, growth of securitization and 
increase in supply of capital, 
• Use of information technology to target vulnerable homeowners, including 
those with equity in homes and unsecured debt, 
• Minimal regulation of mortgage and finance companies, and 
• Weak community reinvestment activities and less attention to fair lending 
in refinance and home equity lending. 
Targeted populations consist primarily of elderly, minority, women and/or low-to-
moderate income homeowners. These households are targeted because the access to 
conventional loans and other financial services is severely disproportionate. It has been 
suggested that elderly populations are usually equity rich and cash poor (Quercia & Rohe, 
1992). Also, their homes may be in need of expensive repairs (often roofing work) or they 
may have fallen behind on their property taxes, incurred substantial medical bills, or suffered 
a loss of income after the death of a spouse (Jesuit Social and International Ministries, 2000). 
In minority and low-income neighborhoods home equity comprises over 60% of the 
net worth (The case against predatory lending, URL). Low and moderate-income 
homeowners are targeted because they appear to have a higher risk of default. This wealth-
stripping impact of predatory lending is harmful given the already existing wealth gap 
between whites and non-whites. According to the US Census Bureau, the median black 
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(African-American) or Hispanic household has one-seventh of the net worth of non-Hispanic 
white household (Knowledgeplex, URL). "A 1998 Federal Reserve survey of consumer 
finance found that white renters had a median income of $22,000, while African-American 
renters earned $13,000 and Hispanic renters earned $19,000. White renters had net-wealth of 
$5,800 three and a half times the net wealth of the amount of African-American renters 
($1,661) and three times the amount for Hispanic renters ($2,000)" (National Housing 
Conference, 2001). 
Predatory lending needs to be explored, explained, and understood for many reasons. 
These practices raise serious issues about community reinvestment, fair housing, and fair 
lending concerns, largely because banks and their mortgage and /or finance company 
subsidiaries appear to be representing the market and targeting minority communities for 
higher priced, lower quality products (Housing Ohio, URL). 
Predatory lending violates the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1972. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 " requires equal treatment in terms 
and conditions of housing opportunities and credit regardless of race, religion, color, national 
origin, family status, or disability" (Bradley & Skillem, 2000, p. 5). The Act has been 
amended to include sex. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1972 requires equal treatment 
in loan terms and availability of credit for all the previously listed categories as well as age, 
sex, and marital status (Bradley & Skillem, 2000). Specifically targeting minority and elderly 
communities is a violation of their protected class status. 
"Predatory and abusive practices by mortgage lenders and brokers, which impose 
excessive and unreasonable charges on homeowners, are pervasive and cause serious harm. 
The American dream of homeownership is jeopardized or denied by these pernicious 
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practices" (Sturdevant & Brennan, 2000, p. 1). The practices undermine the stability of the 
neighborhoods where the loans are made. A major effect of predatory lending is rapid 
turnover of property and ultimately an increase in vacant housing structures. This affects 
property values, which strips wealth from communities that can least afford to lose it (Davis, 
2000). Vacant places become public nuisances as they become places where children play, 
squatters inhibit, and particularly places where criminal activity takes place. Predatory 
lenders abuse families until they can no longer meet their housing expenses. Predatory 
lending also leads to a high volume of foreclosures, which are costly to the holder of the 
mortgage. Each time a foreclosure takes place a family is displaced. 
Nationally the practice of subprime lending has grown exponentially over the past 
several years. The Woodstock Institute (1999) reported that from 1993 to 1998, in the United 
States, home purchase loans by subprime lenders grew 760%. Prime lending grew only 38%. 
This same study also reported that refinance loans by subprime lenders grew by 890% and 
prime lending by only 2.5%. From 1993-1998, 80% of subprime lending was comprised of 
refinance and equity loan. Families and /or individuals become homeowners as an expression 
of independence and to build wealth. In 1993, only 100,000 home purchase or refinance 
loans were brokered in the subprime market; by 1999 that number jumped to nearly 1 million 
loans (US HUD, 2000). 
Subprime lending, locally, is just as popular as the nationally expressed statistics. 
According to CCI, subprime lending is a growing problem in Des Moines, Iowa. From 1993 
to 1998, the number of subprime loans grew from 67 to 1,678. The increase in subprime 
lending in Des Moines from .9% to 20.8% of all loans is astronomical. The state also saw an 
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increase, from 1994 to 1999, in the percentage of Iowa loans that are subprime from 5.8% to 
17.73%. 
Recent changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) have been linked to the 
explosion in direct mail advertising and telemarketing by home equity lenders. The FCRA 
(public law 91-508) was enacted to ensure that credit-reporting agencies provide creditors 
with accurate, up-to-date information regarding one's credit history, and to ensure that this 
information is used only for permissible purposes. Credit covered by the FCRA includes 
personal, family, credit, household credit, and insurance. Identity, employment, credit 
history, and public record information are included as well. 
The FCRA sets forth legal standards governing the collection, use, and 
communication of credit data and certain other information about consumers (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2000). According to Manhattan legal resources, the FCRA allows a consumer 
to challenge the information on his/her credit report on the basis of "completeness and 
accuracy" (Manhattan Legal Resources, URL). 
In 1996, changes made under the act allowed lenders to offer pre-approved loans to 
lists of prospective customers obtained from credit bureaus (The case against predatory 
lending, URL). Many organizations researching predatory lending make statements about 
aggressive marketing and advertisement techniques, but no formal research has been found. 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to determine the prevalence and impact of 
subprime and predatory lending in the Midwestern city of Des Moines, Iowa. Lending 
patterns and marketing strategies, will also be examined. This area has been unexplored or 
underreported in literature on predatory lending. In this research, the strategies that 
encouraged households to become victims of predatory lenders will be studied. One of the 
7 
objectives of this study is to determine the marketing techniques employed by predatory 
lenders. Another objective is to examine the characteristics of victims of predatory loans and 
of borrowers with subprime loans. 
Dissertation Organization 
The organization of this dissertation will proceed as follows: literature review, the 
first article, the second article, and a general conclusion. Because many journals do not 
encourage in-depth literature review sections within journal papers, a literature review is 
being included as a separate chapter. The literature review also will include an overview of 
the general systems theory and conflict theory. 
This dissertation is composed of two manuscripts, prepared for submission to 
scholarly journals. The two manuscripts relate broadly to discrimination in mortgage lending 
and more specifically to subprime and predatory lending. The first article is quantitative in 
nature and is centered around the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for the city 
of Des Moines, Iowa. The second article is a qualitative study using data from Citizens for 
Community Improvement of Des Moines, Iowa (CCI) and the Iowa Attorney General's 
office. 
The first article discusses subprime lending in the city of Des Moines using HMD A 
data. The data identify areas of subprime lending and the probability of reverse redlining 
based on census tracts of the city. Demographic characteristics of the tracts that would 
indicate reverse redlining, such as the median household income and minority population 
percentage, are studied in relation to the lending patterns. 
The second article discusses predatory lending and discriminatory marketing 
techniques utilized in the city of Des Moines, Iowa. Data are generated using interviews 
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conducted by CCI for the CCI/ Fannie Mae Anti-Predatory Lending Initiative. Also included 
in this article is the impact of contract sales, with information from the Attorney General's 
office. Each article contributes to the body of research concerning mortgage-lending 
discrimination. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
"In the United States today, one-half of all homeowners hold at least 50% of their net 
worth in home equity" (The case against predatory lending, URL). This equity is used in 
many ways, such as to start a business or to help with the cost of a child's education. The 
home equity market has doubled in size since 1990 and currently has an annual growth rate 
of 18.8% compared with 4.3% for total consumer debt and 7.5% for total residential 
mortgage debt. 
Predatory lending is a hot topic locally and nationally. With little or no information 
and understanding, or the ability or desire to compare prices, borrowers often rely on the 
information supplied by a mortgage broker. Subprime borrowers pay higher rates and fees, 
and they are much more likely to be victims of predatory lending practices, which, as stated 
previously, strip them of the equity in their homes and can lead to foreclosure (Business 
Wire, 2000). 
Minority and elderly households have experienced most of the increase in subprime 
and predatory lending. Subprime lenders now account for half, 51%, of all refinance loans 
made in predominately black neighborhoods, compared to just 9% of the refinance loans 
made in predominately white neighborhoods (US HUD, 2000). "Studies across the country 
show that Blacks proportionately apply for fewer loans than Whites, yet are rejected more 
often" (Williams & Nesiba, 1997). 
The Rural Housing Institute of Iowa (RHI, 2002) conducted a study on fair lending in 
Iowa, using one metropolitan county and six rural counties. The study used several secondary 
data sources: grantee/grantor index reports, which included a list of all mortgage records file 
in a particular county; Home Mortgage Disclosure Act/ Loan Application Registers 
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(HMDA/LAR) which listed the type and purpose of each application, amount of loan applied 
for, race of applicant and co-applicant, income of applicant, and final disposition of 
application separated by state, county, and census tract; the FDIC deposit summaries by 
county; community reinvestment act performance evaluation; department of transportation 
lien records; local newspaper legal listings of foreclosure; declarations of value report 
(DOV); land contracts, and the US Census. RHI's findings are consistent with those of other 
studies. 
The study showed that the amount of subprime lending that has taken place in Iowa 
has increased in urban and rural Iowa since 1993. It also found that low-to moderate-income 
and minority borrowers were more likely to enter into subprime loans than other borrowers. 
Also, subprime lenders were more likely to make refinance loans than home purchase loans. 
The study did, however, find that subprime lending has not infiltrated the most rural counties 
as deeply as expected (RHI, 2002). This statement is based on their belief that current data 
often exaggerate the presence of subprime lenders in nonmetropolitan counties. 
Discrimination 
Discrimination seems to manifest itself in many ways and in numerous markets. 
According to Holmes and Horvitz (1997), racial discrimination in mortgage lending can take 
and has taken many different forms. Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2002) stated that 
some of these forms include uneven treatment by brokers, pre-application screening, unfair 
application and credit standards in the loan approval process, differing levels of assistance 
provided during the application process, discriminatory pricing practices, and overt bigotry. 
It has been argued that one cause of unequal and segregated housing is mortgage 
lending practices. In the I960's the Kerner Commission reported that the nation was moving 
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in two directions: one direction was African-American and poor and the other was White and 
affluent. Housing discrimination is known to influence many housing outcomes and life 
chances (Yinger, 1998). Yinger (1998) reported that discrimination constrains the 
opportunity to go to good schools, to find jobs, and to accumulate home equity, thus 
providing a rationale for the title of his article: Housing discrimination is still worth worrying 
about. 
In 1989 large disparities in mortgage lending between minority and nonminority 
neighborhoods re focused attention on possible racial discrimination in the home loan market 
(Schill & Wachter, 1993). It has been noted (through housing audits) that sellers and real 
estate agents discriminate against minority home buyers (Turner, 1992). Racial disparity in 
homeownership can be attributed directly to discriminatory practices. Three cities in 1988 
and 1989 (Baltimore, Boston, and Chicago) revealed geographic racial and ethnic disparities 
congruent with home loan discrimination. 
A study by Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1992) found that Blacks and 
Hispanics were 60% more likely than Whites of identical characteristics to be refused a 
mortgage loan after controlling for all variables that underwriters take into account in 
approving or denying loan applications. A study by the Urban Institute in conjunction with 
Syracuse University researched 3,800 realty offices located in 25 cities to explore housing 
discrimination (Urban Institute, 1989). It was found that Blacks experience a 56% rate of 
discrimination in rental units and a 59% rate in home purchases, and that 60-90% of the 
housing units shown to Whites were not available to Blacks. 
The Urban Institute performed another study of discriminatory housing practices in 
25 metropolitan areas in 1990. The study found that African-Americans and Latinos 
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experienced discriminatory practices 55-56% of the time, respectively in the area of housing 
sales market (Nyden, Maly, & Lukehart, 1997). Another finding of the study revealed 
"minorities were frequently steered to different neighborhoods, told units they wanted to see 
were not available, or given less information than White's sources of financing" (Galster, 
1990; Nyden, Maly, & Lukehart, 1997, p. 495). 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston stated that for the same flaws, Whites seem to 
enjoy a presumption of credit worthiness that other minority applicants do not and that 
lenders seem to be more willing to overlook those imperfections for White applicants than 
for minority applicants (Walters, 1996). Ironically, a survey of 1,521 households by the 
National Mortgage Association reported that 87% of the Whites (opposed to 33% of the 
minorities) believe that minority purchasers have the same chance they have of getting a 
home that they can afford (Walters, 1996). 
Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (2001) used audit data to examine how discriminatory 
behavior varied with location across Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. The 
purpose was to gain a better understanding of how housing discrimination occurred. They 
hypothesized that real estate agencies may discriminate to protect their business with 
prejudice White customers. The authors found that discrimination tends to decrease as one 
moves farther away from the real estate agent's office, thus supporting their hypothesis. 
Massey and Lundy (2001) supervised students in an undergraduate research methods 
class to examine if speech patterns are used in housing discrimination. They hypothesized 
that speech patterns offer real estate agencies the opportunity to discriminate over the phone. 
The speech patterns were categorized into three parts: Black English Vernacular, Black 
Accented English, and White Middle Class English. Students in the class collaborated with 
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the authors to design an instrument for use in the telephone audit study. The study was 
conducted, over a four-week period, in the metro area of Philadelphia in the Spring of 1999. 
They developed a script to be followed and created a common set of profiles that were 
assigned to each auditor (male/female). To carry out a more rigorous test of the hypothesis, 
logistic regression was used to predict whether the auditor spoke to an agent, whether a unit 
was reported as available, whether the auditor ultimately granted access to information about 
the unit, and, if so, whether the application fees were required and credit worthiness was 
mentioned as an issue (Massey & Lundy, 2001). It was found that female speakers of Black 
English Vernacular fared the worst. They experienced the lowest possibility of making 
contact and of being told of a unit's availability. On average they were assessed $32 more per 
application than White middle-class males. 
Disparate Treatment and Impact 
There are two types of mortgage discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate 
impact. Disparate treatment occurs when a housing provider treats a member of a protected 
class different from other persons. This type of discrimination is detected easily because it 
typically involves intentional acts of discrimination. Evidence of the motive may be direct, 
such as open hostility, or circumstantial. 
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) addressed disparate treatment of loan 
applications by analyzing data collected in fair lending examinations between 1994 and mid-
1999. Statistical modeling has been emphasized and utilized in the analysis of fair lending 
issues. The fair lending examination conducted most frequently with statistical methods was 
meant to determine whether there was a reasonable cause to believe disparate treatment 
resulted from the acceptance or rejection for home mortgage loans (Courchane, Nebhut, & 
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Nickerson, 2000). In this study, statistical analysis was used to determine if underwriting 
guidelines were applied consistently for all applicants. "The Department of Justice has 
recognized statistical modeling as a valid tool for discovery of disparate treatment in the 
credit-granting process" (Courchane, Nebhut, & Nickerson, 2000 p. 278). It was found that 
statistical analysis could be useful when identifying patterns of discrimination and that 
custom modeling is most effective when used to identify discrimination. 
Disparate impact as a rule or regulation may be neutral on its face, but nonetheless 
have a discriminatory impact on a protected class. Disparate impact is the disproportionate 
effect of higher denial rates (or pricing effects) that any underwriting system likely has and is 
a consequence of statistical group disparities in wealth, income, and other factors affecting 
the group distributions of mortgage applicant's collateral, capacity, and credit (Straka, 2000). 
Disparate impact is not intentional and generally involves policies or laws that cause harm to 
members of a protected class. It can be subtle and even unconscious, but when a significant 
statistical effect is found to be dis favorable to those protected by law, the result is 
discriminatory. A business necessity must be presented as justification. 
The potential misuse of credit scores is an example of disparate impact. It has not 
been shown that the scores or process is discriminatory, but rather how the information is 
used. "Prevention of misuse in scoring requires strong industry communication, education, 
and system design" (Straka, 2000). Straka (2000) also argued that giving too much latitude to 
subjective judgments could bring improper interpretations. 
Holloway & Wyly (2001) contend that both forms of discrimination are 
geographically contingent, that is, that the treatment of minority applicants depends on where 
the property is located, and that the impacts of lending institutions' actions are variable 
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geographically in many ways that differently affect applicants of various racial and ethnic 
groups. 
Racial Segregation and Disparity 
"Residential segregation is a key contemporary institution for creating and 
maintaining inequality, not only for individuals and racial groups, but also for neighborhoods 
and entire municipalities" (Orfield, 1985, p. 161). It is a major influence in abetting 
residential segregation by race (Galster, 1991). Farley and Frey (1994) suggested four 
practices that exacerbate segregation: (1) discriminatory mortgage lending policies, (2) 
violence and intimidation in the face of African-Americans who seek housing in White areas, 
(3) the development of strategies for keeping African-Americans out, and (4) the 
encouragement of segregation in many cities by federally sponsored public housing. These 
practices create racial segregation (as well as class segregation). '"Overall, residential racial 
segregation declined very little in most established metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) over 
the 1960's, but did decline in most MSA's (90 percent) over the 1970's, a decade of rapid 
black suburbanisation" (Mac Donald, 1998). Mac Donald (1998) continued, stating that the 
decline in segregation continued in the 1980 s but at a slower rate than that of the 1970's. 
One of the most influential analyses of racial disparities in mortgage lending was the 
Color of Money (Holloway and Wyly, 2001). In 1988 the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
published a four-part series of articles reporting problems in mortgage credit in African-
American neighborhoods in Atlanta. Following the articles, steps were taken to restrict 
discriminatory lending practices. Some of the steps included "substantial restructuring of the 
mortgage lending industry and regulatory changes that resulted in increased lending to 
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minorities and some optimism for declining discrimination" (Holloway & Wyly, 2001, p. 
85). 
In another study, the National Training and Information Center (NTIC) analyzed 
lending disparities (race/income) between borrowers receiving Citigroup mortgage loans. 
Redlining has been renewed through the abundance of subprime lending affiliates and the 
limited number of prime affiliates. "While communities throughout the 48 states only have 
access to subprime loans originated at Citifinancial branches, only nine metropolitan areas 
have access to prime loans through Citibank branches" (National Training and Information 
Center, 2001, p. 56). 
Using HMD A, NTIC analyzed Citigroup on a national and citywide level including 
eleven cities, two New York boroughs, and five metropolitan statistical areas in Central 
Illinois. The study reported three major trends: (1) nationally 74.1% of Citigroup's home 
loans were originated by financial institutions that originate subprime loans exclusively; (2) 
nationally, as a borrower's income increases so does the likelihood of receiving a prime 
Citigroup home loan; and (3) nationally, African-Americans are more likely to receive a 
subprime loan from Citigroup than are White applicants (African-American: 7.4, Latino: 2.5, 
and White: 2.0) (National Training and Information Center, 2001). 
Redlining and Reverse Redlining 
During the 1970's, lending institutions were commonly accused of redlining -
intentionally withholding funds from areas on the basis of racial and ethnic makeup (Perle, 
Lynch, & Homer, 1993). Lending institutions refused to lend money in the area (presumably) 
by drawing a red pencil line around the area on a map (Morris & Winter, 1978). In the 1960's 
and 1970's, when redlining first surfaced it was not exclusively a racial issue. It was known 
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in mostly older, primarily White neighborhoods of Chicago, Baltimore, and other larger 
cities (Holmes & Horvitz, 1997, p. 51). 
Redlining affects all members of a community regardless of race. It can lead to 
deterioration of living conditions, which is a direct result of disinvestments in neighborhoods. 
"Yet the preponderance of African-American residents in many such areas usually means 
that the policy in effect becomes one of racial discrimination" (Forman, 1971, p. 68). 
The two most widely publicized responses to redlining in mortgage lending were the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 
'"The CRA and HMDA are both the result and the vehicle of community-based efforts to 
combat redlining and other discriminatory bank lending practices" (Schwartz, 1998, p. 270). 
HMDA was enacted in 1975 and required lenders provide information about location (by 
census tract) of loan origination (Yinger, 1995). In 1989 revisions were made to HMDA 
requiring lenders to provide additional information for each individual application (Ladd, 
1998). The new variables include loan guarantee (conventional, FHA, or VA), purpose of 
loan (purchase, improvement, refinancing), loan amount, date of application, loan disposition 
(approved, approved but withdrawn, no lender action taken, or denied), race, census tract, 
gender, if property is owner-occupied, and applicant income. 
The conclusion of many studies using HMDA data indicate that redlining has been 
practiced in numerous places (Holmes & Horvitz, 1997). HMDA has "consistently revealed 
disparities in mortgage credit flaws by neighborhood racial, ethnic, and income 
characteristic... and data have pointed to glaring disparities in mortgage application rejection 
rates by the applicant's race, income, and neighborhood choice" (Carr & Megbolugbe, 1993, 
P. 1). 
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"In January 2002 the Federal Reserve Board announced changes in Regulation C, 
which implements HMD A" (Center for Community Change, URL). The two changes 
receiving the most attention are (1) lenders must designate which of the loans they originate 
are high cost loans and (2) lenders will be required to supply information regarding 
information about the pricing of some loans. Other changes include: indication of which 
applications are for manufactured homes, requirement of reporting denials under "covered" 
pre-approval programs for home purchase loans and the new rule allows an applicant to 
report more than one race. 
Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney (1996) used HMDA (for Boston) to 
determine whether race played an independent role in the mortgage lending decision. This 
study found that minority applicants have less wealth, weak credit histories and high loan to 
value ratios than White applicants do, and that these disadvantages account for a large 
portion of the differences in denial rates. White applicants with the same property and 
personal characteristics as minorities have a rejection rate of 20% compared to the minority 
rate of 28%. 
The Community Reinvestment Act (Title VIII of the Housing and Community 
Development Act) was enacted in 1977. "Passage of CRA made it clear that banks had a 
positive obligation to serve all parts of their market area, and could not distinguish on the 
basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood" (Holmes & Horvitz, 1997, p. 52). 
Assessment factors for determining CRA compliance fall under five categories: 
ascertainment of community credit needs, marketing and types of credit offered and 
extended, geographic distribution of applications and loans and opening and closing of 
offices, discrimination and other illegal activities, and community development (Yinger, 
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1995). If CRA obligations are not met the financial institution will be denied federal approval 
of their applications. Community activists use the CRA challenge process to organize and 
educate members of the community around credit and reinvestment issues (Bohner, 1995). 
A study by Shlay (1999) suggested that local organizing provides the impetus for the 
establishment of a national political climate favorable to serious CRA enforcement. Shlay 
(1999) use a longitudinal and comparative research design to examine the impact of CRA 
organizing on local lending by comparing lending activities among cities that varied in levels 
of CRA organizing activities. Six cities between 1990 and 1995 were used to compare 
residential lending patterns. Of the six cities, three had high levels and three had low levels of 
community organizing around CRA. It was found that all of the cities and lenders revealed 
lending patterns in the direction of more responsible lending to minority and lower-income 
communities (Shlay, 1999). 
Reverse redlining takes place most often in communities where predatory lenders 
face no competition. They purposely take advantage of residents by pushing high cost loans, 
soliciting aggressively over the phone, through the mail, or face-to-face interaction. Many 
reverse redlining loans are so bad that the recipients would be better off not receiving a loan 
at all (Reverse redlining, 1993). 
Reverse redlining was recognized legally as a form of predatory lending in The 
Associates Home Equity v. Troupe. A-3410-00 case (Gallagher, 2001). The Troupes, a 75-
year-old African—American woman and her son, showed that Home Equity Associates 
violated their civil rights. It was proven that the terms of their loan were not justified by their 
credit history and debt-to-income ratio. 
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Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are congressionally chartered, private, 
shareholder-owned corporations that have been regulated by HUD since 1968 and 1989, 
respectively. These Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) fund residential mortgages by 
purchasing loans directly from primary market mortgage originators, such as mortgage 
bankers and depository institutions, and holding these loans in portfolio or by issuing 
mortgage-backed securities which are sold to a wide variety of investors in the capital 
markets. The Congressional charter requires the corporations to achieve public purposes that 
include providing stability and liquidity in the secondary mortgage market, providing 
secondary market assistance relating to mortgages for low-and moderate-income families, 
and promoting access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation, including underserved areas 
(US HUD, 2002). 
"Subprime lending grew in the 1990's largely without the assistance of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (US HUD, 2002, p. I). These agencies purchased only about 14% of 
subprime loans, but plans have been made to increase their purchases in the very near future. 
This idea has been met with some scrutiny. The GSEs believe they can aid in making 
subprime loans more efficient and creating standardized underwriting and pricing guidelines 
in the subprime market (US HUD, 2002). Opponents believe that allowing GSEs to purchase 
more loans is unfair. They anticipate that this will cause a detrimental effect on several 
subprime mortgage market participants and ultimately drive them out of business. 
US HUD (2002) spoke with seven leading company representatives and interviewed 
eleven representatives of organizations "to provide the United States Department of Housing 
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and Urban Development with a preliminary picture of the potential effects of a larger GSE 
role in the subprime markets and suggest an oversight and monitoring strategy that is 
appropriate given HUD's regulatory responsibility and its encouragement of a larger GSE 
role in the subprime market" (p. 2). 
By participating more in the subprime market the GSE could increase the financial 
obligations and meet the expectations of their investors. It was also reported that borrowers 
of subprime loans originated by Fannie Mae are charged lower interest rates (and points and 
fees) than those subprime loans originated elsewhere. 
Most respondents agreed to an increase in the role of GSEs. They did request that 
there be guidelines to prevent the purchasing of loans with predatory features. Five areas of 
concern outlined from the interviews were as follows: interest rates offered, standardization 
of mortgage products, available liquidity, incidence of predatory lending, and risk to the 
GSEs. 
Advantages of Subprime Lending 
Subprime lenders originate loans to individuals who require personalized manual 
underwriting. Based on this process borrowers who are more creditworthy than those with 
lower credit scores are identified and given appropriate prices for loans (US HUD, 2002), 
"Good subprime lenders are able to judge and price risks accurately according to standards 
different from those used in the prime market, and serve customers who would not be eligible 
for "A" credit" (US HUD, 2002, p. viii). Subprime lending has provided lending 
opportunities to a multitude of low-and moderate-income and minority borrowers who a 
decade earlier, might not have qualified (Gale, 2001). 
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"The growth of subprime lending has benefited credit-impaired borrowers, those who 
may have blemished in their credit records, insufficient credit history, or nontraditional credit 
scores" (Bradford, 2002 p.l). Legitimate subprime lending serves a very useful and 
necessary function (National Housing Conference, 2001). "Clearly the increased availability 
of credit for riskier borrowers has played an important role in increasing access to 
homeownership opportunities" (National Housing Conference, 2001, p.5). 
Minority and Low-Income Homeowners 
ACORN (2000) released a study analyzing 1999 home mortgage lending data, which 
found that minority and lower income borrowers are much more likely to receive a higher-
cost subprime mortgage when refinancing or buying a house. ACORN (2000) reported that 
two out of every three conventional refinance loans (61.3%) received by low-income 
African-Americans in 1999 were from subprime lenders and more than half (52.6%) of the 
conventional refinance loans received by moderate-income African-Americans were from 
subprime lenders. Other findings were that the number of subprime loans to African-
American home buyers has risen 631% from 1995 to 1999, while the number of prime 
conventional purchase loans received by African-American home buyers in 1999 was lower 
than in 1995. White homebuyers also saw an increase in the percentage of subprime loans by 
285%. 
Also in 2001, ACORN analyzed data released by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFŒC) about the lending activity of more than 7,800 institutions 
covered by HMD A. The report examined figures for the nation as a whole, as well as for 60 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). To analyze the subprime market, ACORN used the list 
of subprime lenders developed by HUD (ACORN, 2001). This study included findings 
regarding subprime refinance loans and subprime purchase loans. ACORN found that racial 
disparity remained when minority homeowners were compared with white homeowners of 
the same income and it persisted among higher income homeowners. The study also reported 
that subprime lenders also targeted lower income white homeowners and the rate of growth 
of subprime lending had been much faster than the rate of growth of prime lending, 
especially to African-American borrowers (ACORN, 2001). 
Williams and Nesiba (1997) examined racial and economic disparities in the home 
mortgage market of St. Joseph County, Indiana. The study focused primarily on three areas 
of importance: (1) an individual look at the community reinvestment performance (including 
types of institutions, local or non-local ownership, the size of the bank, and location of the 
bank), (2) differences in lending activities with low-income and minority neighborhoods and 
individuals, (3) replicating earlier studies in a moderate-sized urban area as opposed to a 
large area. 
Data was collected using HMDA/LAR, census tracts, and lending institution data. A 
three-part analysis was utilized to generate the most accurate results. This included a 
descriptive analysis of the community reinvestment performance, similarities shared by 
lenders (in regards to low-income and minority neighborhoods, and individuals) and the use 
of multivariate logistic regression to examine the probability of a loan being denied. 
The finding suggested that in St. Joseph County, Indiana credit unions and consumer 
finance corporations did more business with low-income and minority neighborhoods and 
individuals than their counterparts, lender characteristics were related to denial rates, out of 
state lenders seem less affected by race and more affected by income, and small locally 
owned banks tend to have lower denial rates than others (William & Nesiba, 1997). 
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In 2001 Black, Robinson, and Schweitzer reported results from a study investigating 
if banks with different racial ownership make-ups were more likely to accept mortgages from 
applicants that are of a similar race. Researchers used HMDA and a zip code cluster 
technique developed by R. Clair in 1988 to study this type of phenomenon. The Reports of 
Condition and Income Database was used to identify zip codes from a sample of Black-
owned banks. Once this was achieved adjacent zip codes were located. Only Black-owned 
banks with at least one White-owned bank located in the same zip code were used in the 
sample (Black, Robinson, & Schweitzer, 2001). 
Findings revealed that Black-owned banks accepted 70.24% of low-income African-
American applicants compared to 59.47% by White-owned banks. Low-income White 
applicants were four times as likely to be accepted at a Black-owned bank as a White-owned 
bank when compared to Black applicants with similar income. The study concluded that 
African-Americans were more likely to receive a loan at an African-American bank while 
White applicants were equally likely to receive a loan regardless of the bank's racial 
background. 
Older Homeowners 
Although minorities and low-income borrowers have been victims of predatory 
lending so have elderly borrowers. As previously stated elderly homeowners are equity rich 
and cash poor which makes them prime targets for predatory lending practices. The 
American Association of Retired Persons has an array of reports on predatory lending. One 
study (Walters & Hermanson, 2001) analyzed 4,342 mortgage borrowers who had acquired 
first lien mortgage between January 1996 and June 1997. The respondents were asked 
questions about their home mortgages and their survey responses were matched with lending 
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firms and credit scores. "Regression analysis identified financial risk, demographic variables, 
and a variety of other factors as significant indicators of the likelihood of a borrower having a 
subprime mortgage" (Walters & Hermanson, 2001 p. 3). 
The two significant financial risk factors were credit history and loan to value ratio. It 
was found that older borrowers with lower-risk FICO scores (that is 680 and above) were 
less likely to hold a subprime mortgage. "While most older borrowers with low loan-to-
values and high FICO scores held prime mortgages (43%), five percent held subprime 
mortgages" (Walters & Hermanson, 2001, p.4). Gender and ethnicity were the two 
significant demographic factors. It was reported that older females held 45% of the subprime 
and older African-American borrowers held 18% of the subprime mortgages (Walters & 
Hermanson, 2001). Additional significant factors consisted of application hurdles (asked to 
pay off debts, turned down for a mortgage, and asked to provide additional documents), life 
disruptions (decrease in income and medical expenses/ illness), search behavior (interest rate 
searching and responding to advertisements), and financial perceptions and mortgage 
preparedness (in control of finances and mortgage preparedness). "Other factors revealed 
distinctions between older subprime and prime borrowers: subprime borrowers were more 
likely to have been turned down for a mortgage, and to have responded to an advertisement 
offering guaranteed approvals or mortgage loans for people who may have had credit 
problems" (Walters & Hermanson, 2001 p. 7). 
Brown (2000) with the assistance of International Communications Research (ICR) 
questioned U.S. adults age 50 and over about home equity and home improvement loans. 
ICR called 2,114 individuals 50 years and over between October 23 and 31, 2000. Eighty-
five percent of the persons called owned their own primary place of residence. It was found 
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that 86% of the homeowners had seen or heard advertisements for borrowing money against 
their home and 73% have received information offering them the opportunity to borrow 
money against their homes. Brown (2000) also reported that those most likely to get equity 
loan information are younger (under age 65- 80%), more affluent (income S3 OK and over), 
and better educated (college graduates- 80%). Brown found that the most frequent marketing 
techniques used by equity lenders were mail (92%), phone (38%), and email (12%). When 
asked how they selected their lender; 62% of the respondents said they applied to a personal 
bank or credit union, 16% said they applied to a broker, and 28% said that they selected their 
lender based on their solicitations (advertisement- 15% and mail, phone, or door-to-door-
13%). 
In a report by the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) it was stated 
that older homeowners are especially vulnerable to predatory loans because they are likely to 
be home during the day, available for telephone and door-to-door solicitations. "Consumers 
may first fall victim to predatory lending when a door-to-door solicitation from someone 
offering to perform home repair work and, conveniently, offering to finance the cost of the 
work through a loan" (NAAG, 2001 p. 1). Door-to-door sellers often offer to let borrowers 
sign paperwork at the kitchen table. 
Information Technology 
Gale (2001) researched subprime lending and the Internet. He suggested that while 
the mortgage lending industry was slow to adopt some of the opportunities of the information 
age, it is quickly changing. One innovation discussed was that of the geodemographic-
marketing tool. This electronic search tool permitted lenders to identify clusters of 
households by demographic characteristics such as age, income, home value, and other 
28 
variables (Gale, 2001). Micro Vision, another information age invention, identifies four 
demographically and behaviorally distinct types of segments of households. They range from 
the "Upper Crust" to "Trying Rural Times". PRJZM, another innovation, provides 62 clusters 
across 15 social groups, including "Blue Blood Estates" to the remote rural families of "Blue 
Highway" (Gale, 2001 p.9). There are many other geodemographic search tools. These 
services allow organizations and businesses to target areas based on their criteria. "In the 
case of mortgage lenders, once geographic units such as zip codes and census tracts are 
classified according to their inhabitants' primary characteristics, mass mailings and 
telemarketing solicitations can contact nearly all addresses in the geographic unit" (Gale, 
2001 p.9). While no one has studied the extent to which subprime lenders use this 
information it displays how feasible it is to target specific neighborhoods. 
Foreclosures 
A major indicator that predatory lending may be prevalent in a neighborhood is the 
incidence of a high number of foreclosures. "The most compelling evidence that subprime 
lending has become a fertile ground for predatory practices is the current disproportionate 
percentage of subprime loan foreclosures in low-income and minority neighborhoods" 
(Fishbein & Bunce, 2001). A recent study by Stock (2001) utilized records of mortgage 
foreclosures in Montgomery County, Ohio. The data were based on county recorder data on 
mortgages, auditor data on property appraisals and bases, and loan application register data 
from HMDA to access the extent of predatory lending in Montgomery County. 
There were also 27 interviews with a sample of homeowners whose mortgage 
foreclosures exhibited evidence of predatory practice and 200 interviews with a sample of 
people who had mortgage loans (not foreclosed) with lenders who have been identified as 
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using predatory practices (Stock, 2001). Stock (2001) found that from 1994 to 2000, 
mortgage foreclosure filings in Montgomery County increased from 1,022 to 2,451. From 
1994 to 1999 the percent of foreclosures rose continuously (19% to 48%) and then dropped 
sharply in 2000 (41%). The subprime lenders that exhibited predatory characteristics account 
for 65% of the subprime associated foreclosures in 2000 (Stock, 2001). Through the 
telephone-conducted interviews, Stock (2001) found that 45% of the mortgage foreclosure 
respondents and 24% of current mortgage respondents' terms at closing were different than 
the terms that had been discussed during the process. Charges in the terms were often 
associated with high fees, interest rates, balloon payment, and hidden insurance fees. 
Another foreclosure study was conducted by Abt Associates, Inc. (Gruenstein & 
Hubert, 2000). Abt Associates, Inc., who obtained data from the Atlanta foreclosure records 
between 1996 and 1999, compared foreclosures of loans by subprime and non-subprime 
lenders and identified subprime lenders that primarily originated subprime loans. 
They found that foreclosures in Atlanta declined by 7% (1996-1999), but the volume 
of foreclosures started by subprime lenders grew by 232%. The Abt study (US HUD, 2000) 
mentioned that the foreclosures in Atlanta, in the subprime market, occurred amidst a trend 
of rapidly increasing subprime lending. Abt Associates, Inc. also found that the subprime 
share of foreclosures was highest in lower-income and predominately minority 
neighborhoods. 
A study by ACORN (2002) in Bemadillo County, New Mexico, found a three-fold 
increase in foreclosure filings between 1996-2001. In 1996, Bemadillo County in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, logged 673 mortgage foreclosures. In 2001 the number increased 
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to 2,160. This area showed a substantial increase in the subprime lender share of mortgage 
foreclosures, but only a slight decline in the prime lender share of mortgage foreclosures. 
In 1999, NTIC and NietoGomez et al. studied the subprime market in Chicago. This 
study was composed of three parts: Quantitative research, case study, and individual stories. 
Quantitative data were used from two major sources: the foreclosure report of Chicago 
(FRC) and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Results in part one indicated that 
subprime lenders were responsible for 30 foreclosures in 1993 and 1,417 in 1998, a 4,623 % 
increase (NietoGomez et al., 1999). Foreclosures on high-rate loans increased more than 
400% and foreclosures on home loans less than four years old tripled. 
The second part used the "Neighborhood Foreclosure and Abandonment Survey" as a 
case study to investigate the relationship between subprime lending and housing 
abandonment. The case study focused on a southside neighborhood in Chicago. Results 
indicated that on average two properties per block, in a 36-block area, was foreclosed in 1998 
(NietoGomez et al., 1999). Sixty-four percent of these abandoned properties were originated 
by subprime lenders or were high interest rate loans. Based on the case study researchers 
speculated that abandonment ultimately would have a negative effect on the property values 
within that neighborhood. The neighborhood, physically, becomes unattractive. Abandoned 
places become public nuisances. Communities will be destroyed, which upsets the cohesion 
between community members, and ultimately lives will be changed. In a time when self-
sufficiency is on everyone's mind it is depressing to encounter practices that may cost people 
their homes and their independence. 
Studies of foreclosure have been conducted in cities such as Chicago, Boston, 
Atlanta, and Baltimore. Based on these previous studies on foreclosure and 16 large 
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subprime lenders, Fishbein & Bunce (2001) suggest that special attention be shown to the 
following areas: foreclosures of subprime loans have increased substantially with the growth 
of subprime loan originations; subprime loans account for a larger share of overall 
foreclosures than of total loan originations; subprime lenders are quick to foreclose: subprime 
foreclosures are disproportionately concentrated in low-income and predominately African-
American neighborhoods; and the estimated volume of subprime foreclosures is substantial. 
Predatory Lending Practices 
There are a number of abusive lending practices associated with predatory lending. 
The following list describes several common practices that occur. 
Marketing 
• Solicitations to targeted neighborhoods: Victims of predatory lending 
frequently describe being subjected to a flood of phone calls and letters 
from brokers and lenders, encouraging them to take out a home equity 
loan (The case against predatory lending, URL). They also advertise 
through television commercials, highly visible signs in neighborhoods, 
door-to-door solicitations, and flyers stuffed in mailboxes. Many 
companies deceptively tailor their solicitations to resemble social security 
or other government checks to prompt homeowners to open the envelopes 
and otherwise deceive them about the transaction (Sturdevant & Brennan, 
Jr., 2000). 
• Home Improvement Scams: Local home improvement companies are used 
to arrange loan business. The company may originate a mortgage loan to 
finance the improvements and sell the mortgage to a predatory lender for 
financing of the improvements (Sturdevant & Brennan, Jr., 2000). 
• Steering: Steering occurs when predatory lenders deliberately turn or steer 
borrowers into loans with high interest rates. 
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Sales 
• Shifting Unsecured Debt Into Mortgages: The benefits of consolidating 
bills into mortgage loan are embellished without note of the 
disadvantages. This practice increases the monthly payments and 
exacerbates the risk that the homeowner will lose the home (Sturdevant & 
Brennan, 2000). 
• Bait and Switch: A lender offers one set of loan terms when the borrower 
applies but pressures the borrower to accept worse terms at closing 
(National People's Action, URL). 
The Loan 
• High Annual Interest Rate: Predatory lenders charge interest rates well 
above prime rate and not justified by risk. Predatory lenders are able to 
charge these interest rates (frequently 14%-18%) because subprime 
borrowers with limited financial resources or knowledge may be relegated 
to finding credit at any price (The case against predatory lending, URL). 
• Balloon Payments: This practice involves setting up a loan so that at the 
end of the loan period the borrower still owes most of the principal 
amount borrowed. The balloon payment is often hidden and is structured 
to force foreclosure or refinance. 
• Asset-Based Lending: This simply means to lend without regard to ability 
to repay. Individuals who are equity rich and cash poor are prime targets 
for this tactic. This type of lending is designed to fail. 
• Padded Closing Costs: A method of getting additional money by which, 
certain costs and fees are increased above the typical costs. 
After Closing 
• Flipping: This is also a very common practice. Loan flipping involves the 
successive repeated refinancing of the loan by rolling the balance of an 
existing loan into an unnecessary new loan. There is usually no benefit to 
the borrower. 
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• Prepayment Penalties: This tactic is used to lock borrowers into high 
interest rates. Borrowers are charged huge fees when or if there is a 
decision to pay off a loan early (or possibly refinance into another one). 
• Abusive Collection Practices: To make sure that the payments are received 
continuously lenders call homeowners at all hours. Some borrowers are 
contacted prior to the grace period. These tactics often involve threats to 
evict the homeowner immediately, even though the lenders know they first 
must foreclose and follow eviction procedures (Sturdevant & Brennan, 
2000). 
While many of he loan terms previously mentioned may not be predatory on their 
own, the failure of the lender to disclose fully to the borrower the risk or cost associated with 
each individual term can make the loan package more problematic, especially if the borrower 
is unaware that better terms may be available (Housing Ohio, URL). 
Theoretical Framework 
Two theoretical perspectives provide the basis for this dissertation: General Systems 
Theory (GST) and Social Conflict Theory. The two theories guide an understanding of 
housing finance, especially subprime and predatory lending. GST is a theory embedded in 
harmony. The theory suggests that parts of a society must work in a smooth and orderly 
manner for the system to survive. GST fits well with the institutional approach using Home 
Mortgage Disclosure data to study subprime lending and potential problems for homeowners. 
Social conflict theory states that conflict is a natural occurring process that can be used to 
provide solutions to problems. Conflict theory fits well with the qualitative, grassroots 
approach using files of homeowners who voice their concerns about predatory lending 
experiences. Both theories provide insight into relevant aspects of how mortgage lending and 
contract sales can be problematic for homeowners and communities. 
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General Systems Theory 
Theory guides research by determining why an event has occurred. General Systems 
Theory (GST) is based on the belief that society is a system of highly interrelated parts that 
operate together harmoniously. This idea reflects a system of legitimate, effective subprime 
lending. Subprime lending was created to ensure those individuals with less than an "A" 
credit rating would have access to financial means. According to GST each part serves a very 
useful function and contributes to the overall performance of the system. Discriminatory acts 
occur because parts of society are not functioning in a harmonious manner, thus providing 
the initiation of abusive subprime lending. 
Abusive subprime lending can be addressed in relation to the major concepts of the 
GST. The major concepts are interdependence/mutual influence, boundaries, equifinality, 
and feedback. Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, and Steinmetz (1993) stated that the 
components in a system are interdependent, or held together in a system, and that behaviors 
of the components exhibit mutual influence, meaning that what happens with one component 
generally affects every other component. If one house is affected by abusive subprime 
lending then there is potential for the whole block to be affected. When one block is affected 
the tract is affected. When one tract is affected then the city is affected, and so on. 
Deteriorating structures or abandoned houses make neighborhoods unattractive visually, and 
in extreme cases causes property values to become stagnant or decrease. 
Boundaries are the point of contact where one system ends and another begins or the 
point of contact between the system (neighborhood) and other systems (lending institutions). 
Boundaries define membership in a system. The environment itself may be viewed as a 
supra-system because human systems are embedded in and transact strongly with the 
35 
environment. It is difficult to gain a full understanding of human systems because political, 
economic, and social matrices must be taken into account (Boss, et al. 1993). 
The concept of boundary in families usually is expressed in one of two ways: 
assessment of permeability or of the inverse, the internal cohesion of the family (Constantine, 
1986) or by the emotional connectedness among family members (Olson, Sprenkle, & 
Russell, 1979). This explanation can be transferred to neighborhoods, to include cohesion or 
lack thereof in areas affected by discriminatory lending practices. It is not uncommon for 
individuals to become attached to their home, community, and in many cases their neighbors. 
Communities provide a basis for stability and neighbors are important when forming social 
bonds. 
Equifinality is the ability to achieve the same goals through different routes. The 
ultimate goal is to eliminate discriminatory lending and all forms of abusive lending tactics. 
There may be several ways to achieve this, such as passing legislation, educating individuals 
(homeowners and prospective homeowners) about the problem, or forming a community 
awareness group made up of members of the community, advocates of neighborhood 
cohesion, realtors, and bankers. 
Feedback is a response or reaction. It involves a path of communication known as the 
feedback loop. Feedback loops come in two forms: positive or negative. A positive feedback 
loop amplifies deviation while a negative feedback loop seeks to restore or maintain 
equilibrium, thus operating to reduce deviation. The decision as to whether a behavior is 
positive or negative is contingent upon not the content but the effect on the system. In 
discriminatory lending, the pattern of discrimination is problematic for all members of a 
community and therefore, the appropriate feedback loop is negative. 
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GST also has three key assumptions: I) GST has the potential for unifying science, 2) 
a system must be understood as a whole, and 3) human systems are self-reflexive (Boss, et al. 
1993). The third assumption is most important in combating predatory lending. Self-
re flexivity refers to the ability to make oneself and one's behavior the object of the 
examination and the target of the explanation (Boss, et al. 1993). Communities, as a whole, 
can use this action to their advantage. Self-Reflexivity assists when organizing and 
determining ways to combat a common threat (such as in the case of unfair lending tactics). 
Through the analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure data patterns of unfair lending practices 
can be uncovered. Once unfair lending tactics are documented, communities and 
neighborhoods can organize efforts to counteract the marketing of abusive lenders. Because 
local units are part of the system, GST supports the concept of neighborhoods educating 
themselves about homeownership and abusive lending practices. 
Another major component of GST is effective communication. Perceptions of what 
abusive subprime lending means individually could and probably does differ from person to 
person. Individual differences in realities exist, of course, but within a given society there 
exists a consensus on tolerable differences in realities (Berger & Kellner, 1964). In simpler 
terms, although subprime lending is understood differently, there is an agreement that it can 
be a form of abuse and that ultimately abusive subprime lending can deteriorate 
neighborhoods. 
Social Conflict Theory 
Based on the review of literature of predatory lending, it seems that borrowers lack 
vital information they need to make sound financial decisions. Therefore, the lenders, with 
more knowledge, have power over the less knowledgeable. Most research reviewed on this 
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topic has occurred at the grassroots local level without consideration for theory. To better 
understand predatory lending, it is important to consider theoretical contexts. Social conflict 
theory provides a basic understanding of the concept of predatory lending. The basic premise 
of social conflict theory is that society is in a constant state of disagreement with only 
temporary periods of stability. Social conflict theory emphasizes that in any social group, 
organization, or society, positions of unequal power probably exist (Kammeyer, Ritzer, & 
Yetman, 1994). The incumbents of these positions, those with greater power and resources 
(the lenders, financial institutions, etc.) and those with fewer resources (borrowers, possibly 
those considered to be less sophisticated) according to this theory are engaged in a 
continuous struggle. 
Conflict theory encompasses several aspects of predatory lending. According to 
Farrington & Chertok (1993), conflict exists because individuals are motivated to act in 
accordance with their own interests. "Conflict theorists are interested in how society's 
institutions- including the family, government, religion, education, and the media- may help 
to maintain the privileges of some groups and keep others in subservient positions" 
(Schaefer, 2002, p. 15). As the name implies predatory lenders prey on homeowners' equity 
and attempt to take control of resources. Homeowners are also interested in building equity 
and maintaining control of their neighborhoods. They share a common interest, which is 
where the conflict occurs. 
The major constructs of social conflict theory are power, coercion, authority, and 
stratification. Power refers to the ability to get others to do what you want even against their 
will. Power is legitimate because it is sanctioned by social norms (Farrington & Chertok, 
1993). Power structures are many times obscured so that the dominant group doesn't seem as 
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"dominant" or in other words power structures minimize the advantage of the dominant 
group. The dominant group, in predatory lending, is the lender and the weaker group is the 
unaware homeowner. 
Conflict has strengths. If limited in amount and manner, conflict could create 
individual growth. Conflict theory provides a basis foi not only why predatory lending exists 
but can lead the way to solutions. Conflict also increases internal cohesion. Conflict has the 
ability to bring people together (community, advocates, etc.) to fight against a common 
enemy (predatory lenders). This is the blueprint for what communities and advocates for 
healthy communities are doing. Based on conflict theory, communities can become educated 
about predatory lending and take action to prevent it. 
Integration of Theories 
Each theory plays an important role in understanding abusive lending. The theories 
provide guidance for exploring and explaining the intricacies of subprime lending and 
potential discriminatory mortgage lending and contract sales. General systems theory 
explains how the parts of society can break down and how the system can regain stability. 
Conflict theory provides an understanding of the struggle and what communities must do to 
deter discrimination in mortgage lending and contract sales. By integrating the theories, it is 
possible to produce communities grounded in knowledge and equipped with skills useful for 
fighting abusive subprime lending and to alter the system beyond a local community through 
legislation and legal action to help regain stability and fairness in housing finance. 
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CHAPTER 3. Subprime Lending and Reverse Redlining: An Analysis Using HMD A 
A paper to be submitted to the Journal of Housing Research 
Thessalenuere Hinnant-Bernard and Sue R. Crull1 
Abstract 
In this research endeavor, subprime lending and reverse redlining were examined. 
Using data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and Census tracts, over 8,000 loan 
applicant registers in the city of Des Moines, Iowa were studied regarding the probability of 
applicants being victims of reverse redlining, an abusive tactic in mortgage lending. Logistic 
regression was used to analyze the data. The results suggest that race, income, loan amount, 
and loan purpose are significant factors in reverse redlining. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to determine the prevalence of subprime lending by 
geographic location, specifically in relation to the census tracts in the city of Des Moines, 
Iowa. Also, this study explores the likelihood of reverse redlining in relation to the 
demographic characteristics of the tract and lending patterns within the tract. 
Subprime Lending 
Subprime lending is a very vital part of the economy. Subprime lenders provide loans 
to borrowers who do not meet standards, which would make them "prime" borrowers. "Fair 
subprime lenders make loans that are appropriately priced to compensate for the risk of 
lending to a credit-blemished borrower" (Citibank, URL). Although these borrowers are 
1 Graduate Student and Associate Professor, respectively, Department of Human Development and Family 
Studies, Iowa State University. 
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charged more than prime borrowers, the higher cost associated with higher interest rates do 
not make the victims of abusive practices that define predatory lending. 
However, subprime loans are often given to borrowers with good credit. Citizens for 
Community Improvement (CCI) of Des Moines found that 63% of the subprime loans in Des 
Moines are made to people eligible for prime loans. This is unethical and considered to be a 
predatory practice (CRA-NC, URL). 
The subprime market has grown dramatically. The growth occurred between 1993 
and 1998 (Housing Ohio, URL). There was an explosion of loans combined with the nearly 
hyper-segmentation of mortgage lending markets by race and neighborhood, which created 
opportunities for abuse. This two-tier system has increased the opportunity for abuses within 
the market, especially targeting less sophisticated homeowners. 
According to the Woodstock Institute (1999), there are several reasons that explain 
the growth of subprime and abusive subprime lending: 
• Increase in homeownership among the less experienced, 
• Increase in medical and credit card debt, 
• Use of information technology to target vulnerable homeowners, 
• Minimal regulation of mortgage and finance companies, and 
• Weak Community Reinvestment Activities and less attention to fair 
lending in refinance and home equity lending 
Targeted populations consist primarily of elderly, minority, women, and/or low-to-
Moderate-income homeowners. These households are targeted because the access to 
conventional loans and other financial services is severely limited. It has been suggested that 
elderly populations are usually equity rich and cash poor (Quercia & Rohe, 1992). Also, their 
homes may be in need of expensive repairs (often roofing work) or they may have fallen 
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behind on their property taxes, incurred substantial medical bills, or suffered a loss of income 
after the death of a spouse (Jesuit & International Ministries, 2000). 
Nationally the practice of subprime lending has grown exponentially over the past 
several years. The Woodstock Institute (1999) reported that from 1993 to 1998, in the United 
States, home purchase loans by subprime lenders grew 760% and prime lending grew only 
38%. This same study also reported that refinance loans by subprime lenders grew by 890%, 
and by only 2.5%. From 1993-1998, 80% of subprime lending was comprised of refinance 
and equity loans. In 1993, only 100,000 home purchase or refinance loans were brokered in 
the subprime market; by 1999 that number jumped to nearly 1 million loans (US HUD, 
2000). 
According to a flyer distributed by CCI (2001), the National Training and 
Information Center (NTIC, 2001) of Chicago found that 2,991 subprime loans were 
originated in Iowa in 1994. Five years later, in 1999 15,291 subprime loans were originated. 
In 1994 in Des Moines (NTIC, 2001), 198 subprime loans were originated and by 1999 that 
amount increased to 1,903 (Figure 1). 
Discrimination 
Discrimination seems to manifest itself in many ways and in numerous markets. 
According to Holmes and Horvitz (1997), racial discrimination in mortgage lending can take 
and has taken many different forms. Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2002) stated that 
some of these forms include uneven treatment by brokers, pre-application screening, unfair 
application and credit standards in the loan approval process, differing levels of assistance 
provided during the application process, discriminatory pricing practices, and overt bigotry. 
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It has been argued that one cause of unequal and segregated housing is mortgage 
lending practices. In the I960's the Kerner Commission reported that the nation was moving 
in two directions: one direction was African-American and poor, and the other was White 
and affluent. Housing discrimination is known to influence many housing outcomes and life 
chances (Yinger, 1998). Yinger (1998) reported that discrimination constrains the 
opportunity to go to good schools, to find jobs, and to accumulate home equity, thus 
providing a rationale for the title of his article: "Housing discrimination is still worth 
worrying about." 
In 1989 large disparities in mortgage lending between minority and non minority 
neighborhoods refocused attention on possible racial discrimination in the home loan market 
(Schill & Wachter, 1993). It has been noted (through housing audits) that sellers and real 
estate agents discriminate against minority home buyers (Turner, 1992). Racial disparity in 
homeownership can be attributed directly to discriminatory practices. Three cities in 1988 
and in 1989 (Baltimore, Boston, and Chicago) revealed geographic racial and ethnic 
disparities congruent with home loan discrimination (Freeman, 2000). 
A study by Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1992) found that Blacks and 
Hispanics were 60% more likely than Whites of identical characteristics to be refused a 
mortgage loan after controlling for all variables that underwriters take into account in 
approving or denying loan applications. A study by the Urban Institute in conjunction with 
Syracuse University researched 3,800 realty offices located in 25 cities to explore housing 
discrimination (Urban Institute, 1989). It was found that Blacks experience a 56% rate of 
discrimination in rental units and a 59% rate in home purchases, and that 60-90% of the 
housing units shown to Whites were not available to Blacks. 
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The Urban Institute performed a study of discriminatory housing practices in 25 
metropolitan areas in 1990. The study found that African-Americans and Latinos 
experienced discriminatory practices approximately 55% of the time, in the area of housing 
sales market (Nyden, Maly, & Lukehart, 1997). Another finding of the study revealed 
minorities were frequently steered to different neighborhoods, told units they wanted to see 
were not available, or given less information than White's sources of financing (Galster, 
1990; Nyden, Maly, & Lukehart, 1997, p. 495). 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston stated that for the same flaws, Whites seem to 
enjoy a presumption of credit worthiness that minority applicants do not and that lenders 
seem to be more willing to overlook credit imperfections for White applicants than for 
minority applicants (Walters, 1996). Ironically, a survey of 1,521 households by the National 
Mortgage Association reported that 87% of the Whites (opposed to 33% of the minorities) 
believe that minority purchasers have the same chance they have of getting a home that they 
can afford (Walters, 1996). 
Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (2001) used audit data to examine how discriminatory 
behavior varied with location across Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. The 
purpose was to gain a better understanding of how housing discrimination occurred. They 
hypothesized that real estate agencies may discriminate to protect their business with 
prejudice White customers. The authors found that discrimination tends to decrease as one 
moves farther away from the real estate agent's office, thus supporting their hypothesis. 
Massey and Lundy (2001) supervised students in an undergraduate research methods 
class to examine if speech patterns are used in housing discrimination. They hypothesized 
that speech patterns offer real estate agencies the opportunity to discriminate over the phone. 
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The speech patterns were categorized into three types: Black English Vernacular, Black 
Accented English, and White Middle Class English. Students in the class collaborated with 
the authors to design an instrument for use in the telephone audit study. The study was 
conducted, over a four-week period, in the metro are of Philadelphia in the Spring of 1999. 
They developed a script to be followed and then they created a common set of profiles that 
were assigned to each auditor (male/female). 
Logistic regression was used to predict whether the auditor spoke to an agent, 
whether a unit was reported as available, whether the auditor ultimately granted access to 
information about the unit, and if so, whether the application fees were required and credit 
worthiness was mentioned as an issue (Massey & Lundy, 2001). It was found that female 
speakers of Black English Vernacular fared the worst. They experienced the lowest 
possibility of making contact and of being told of a unit's availability. On average they were 
assessed $32 more per application than White middle-class males. 
Disparate Treatment and Impact 
There are two types of mortgage discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate 
impact. Disparate treatment occurs when a housing provider treats a member of a protected 
class different, than other persons. This type of discrimination is easily detected because it 
typically involves intentional acts of discrimination. Evidence of the motive may be direct, 
such as open hostility, or circumstantial. The following scenario is an example of disparate 
treatment. A customer, of a protected class, enters a bank and inquires about mortgage 
options. He is told to fill out an application and return it. An identically qualified White 
applicant enters the establishment, inquires about mortgage options, and is given an interview 
immediately. 
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Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) addressed disparate treatment of loan 
applications by analyzing data collected in fair lending examinations between 1994 and mid-
1999. Statistical modeling has been emphasized and utilized in the analysis of fair lending 
issues. The fair lending examination conducted most frequently with statistical methods was 
meant to determine whether there was a reasonable cause to believe disparate treatment 
resulted from the acceptance or rejection for home mortgage loans (Courchane, Nebhut, & 
Nickerson, 2000). In this study, statistical analysis was used to determine if underwriting 
guidelines were applied consistently for all applicants. "The Department of Justice has 
recognized statistical modeling as a valid tool for discovery of disparate treatment in the 
credit-granting process" (Courchane, Nebhut, & Nickerson, 2000, p. 278). It was found that 
statistical analysis could be useful when identifying patterns of discrimination and that 
custom modeling is most effective when used to identify discrimination. The authors found 
that three out of the eleven banks in their sample treated minorities differently. 
Disparate impact as a rule or regulation may be neutral on its face but nonetheless 
have a discriminatory impact on a protected class. Disparate impact is the disproportionate 
effect of higher denial rates (or pricing effects) that any underwriting system likely has and is 
consequence of statistical group disparities in wealth, income, and other factors affecting the 
group distributions of mortgage applicant's collateral, capacity, and credit (Straka, 2000). 
Disparate impact is not intentional and generally involves policies or laws that cause harm to 
members of a protected class. It can be subtle and even unconscious, but when a significant 
statistical effect is found to be disfavorable to those protected by law, the result is 
discriminatory. A business necessity must be presented as justification. 
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The potential misuse of credit scores is an example of disparate impact. It has not 
been shown that the scores or process is discriminatory but disparate impact is possible in 
how the scores are used. "Prevention of misuse in scoring requires strong industry 
communication, education, and system design" (Straka, 2000). Straka (2000) also argued that 
giving too much latitude to subjective judgments could bring improper interpretations. 
Holloway and Wyly (2001) contend that both forms of discrimination are 
geographically contingent. The treatment of minority applicants depends on where the 
properties are located, and that the impacts of lending institutions' actions are geographically 
variable in ways that affect differently applicants based on their racial and ethnic groups. 
Redlining 
During the I970's, lending institutions were commonly accused of redlining -
intentionally withholding funds from areas on the basis of racial and ethnic makeup (Perle, 
Lynch, & Homer, 1993). Lending institutions refused to lend money in the area (presumably) 
by drawing a red pencil line around the area on a map (Morris & Winter, 1978). In the 1960 s 
and 1970's, when redlining first surfaced it was not exclusively a racial issue. It was known 
in mostly older, primarily White neighborhoods of Chicago, Baltimore, and other larger 
cities (Holmes & Horvitz, 1997, p. 51). "Yet the preponderance of African-American 
residents in many such areas usually means that the policy in effect becomes one of racial 
discrimination" (Forman, 1971, p. 68). 
The two most widely publicized responses to redlining in mortgage lending were the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 
"The CRA and HMDA are both the result and the vehicle of community-based efforts to 
combat redlining and other discriminatory bank lending practices" (Schwartz, 1998, p. 270). 
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Just as neighborhoods where once identified as African-American or White they are 
now being identified as subprime or prime. 
"Increasingly, sub-prime lending is becoming the only option of all too many low-
income and minority borrowers. This reality sadly documents the continued existence 
of the race line in America and the continued existence of the dual lending market in 
the United States. Whereas before, African Americans were openly denied access to 
credit, today the "race tax" is more sophisticated, more costly - and equally 
exploitative. Where once redlining undermined communities, today "reverse 
redlining" has become the norm and threatens to undermine our communities' 
economies, social services, and tax base. Sadly, an analogy to racial profiling is 
appropriate here. We have all become familiar with the term "Driving While Black." 
Sub-prime predatory lending has become the equivalent of "Borrowing While Black" 
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (2001). 
Reverse redlining takes place most often in areas where predatory lenders face no 
competition. Some subprime lenders purposely take advantage of residents by pushing high 
cost loans, soliciting aggressively over the phone, through the mail, or by face-to-face 
interaction. Many loans that characteristically are called "reverse redlining loans" are so bad 
that the recipients would be better off not receiving a loan at all (United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 2001). 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), enacted in 1975, required lenders to 
provide information about location (by census tract) of loan originations (Yinger, 1995). In 
1989 revisions were made to HMD A requiring lenders to provide additional information for 
each individual application (Ladd, 1998). The new variables include loan guarantee 
(conventional, FHA, or VA), purpose of loan (purchase, improvement, refinancing), loan 
amount, date of application, loan disposition (approved, approved but withdrawn, no lender 
action taken, or denied), race, census tract, gender, owner-occupied status, and applicant 
income. 
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HMDA does have some discrepancies that need to be addressed. Missing data in 
HMDA is a serious problem. Although race is required when reporting data, it is not always 
reported. Applications taken entirely by mail or telephone may lack this vital piece of 
information. The rising incidence of missing data on race in recent years and emerging 
technological trends in the mortgage industry, which facilitate lending without face-to-face 
contact, make it reasonable to predict that this problem will become more serious in the not-
to-distant future (Huck, 2001). Fair housing was established to ensure that minorities were 
being treated fairly in housing. It is paradoxical when questions regarding race are not 
required for applicants applying through the mail or by phone. This makes it very difficult to 
use HMDA to determine how much, if any, discrimination is occurring; thus providing an 
environment for abusive mortgage lending to prosper. 
"In January 2002 the Federal Reserve Board announced changes in Regulation C. 
which implements HMDA" (Center for Community Change, URL). The two changes 
receiving the most attention are: (1) lenders must designate which of the loans they originate 
are high-cost loans; and (2) lenders will be required to provide information regarding 
information about the pricing of some loans. Other changes include: (1) indication of which 
applications are for manufactured homes, (2) requirement of reporting denials under 
"covered" pre-approval programs for home purchase loans, and (3) the new rule allows an 
applicant to report more than one race. A very important amendment, effective January 1, 
2003, requires lenders to ask applicants their race or national origin and sex in applications 
taken by telephone, conforming the telephone application rule to the rule applicable to mail 
and Internet applications (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, URL). 
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The conclusion of many studies using HMDA data indicate that redlining has been 
practiced in numerous places (Holmes & Horvitz, 1997). HMDA has "consistently revealed 
disparities in mortgage credit flaws by neighborhood racial, ethnic, and income 
characteristics ... and data have pointed to glaring disparities in mortgage application 
rejection rates by the applicant's race, income, and neighborhood choice" (Munnell, Tootell, 
Browne, & McEneaney, 1996). 
Munnell, et al. (1996) used HMDA (for Boston) to determine whether race played an 
independent role in the mortgage lending decision. This study found that minority applicants 
have less wealth, weaker credit histories and higher loan to value ratios than White applicants 
do, and that these disadvantages account for a large portion of the differences in denial rates. 
White applicants with the similar property and personal characteristics as minorities have a 
rejection rate of 20% compared to the minority rate of 28%. 
Minority and Low Income Homeowners 
Association of Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN, 2000) released a 
study analyzing 1999 home mortgage lending data, which found that minority and lower 
income borrowers are much more likely to receive a higher- cost subprime mortgage when 
refinancing or buying a house. ACORN (2000) reported that two out of every three 
conventional refinance loans (61.3%) received by low-income African-Americans in 1999 
were from subprime lenders and more than half (52.6%) of the conventional refinance loans 
received by moderate-income African-Americans were from subprime lenders. Other 
findings were that the number of subprime loans to African-American home buyers has risen 
631% from 1995 to 1999, while the number of prime conventional purchase loans received 
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by African-American home buyers in 1999 was lower than in 1995. White homebuyers also 
saw an increase in the percentage of subprime loans by 285%. 
Also in 2001, ACORN analyzed data released by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC) about the lending activity of more than 7,800 institutions 
covered by HMDA, including figures for the nation as a whole, as well as for 60 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). In order to analyze the subprime market, ACORN used 
the list of subprime lenders developed by HUD (ACORN, 2001). This study included 
findings regarding subprime refinance loans and subprime purchase loans. ACORN found 
that racial disparity remained when minority homeowners were compared with white 
homeowners of the same income and it persisted among higher income homeowners. The 
study also reported that subprime lenders also targeted lower income white homeowners and 
the rate of growth of subprime lending had been much faster than the rate of growth of prime 
lending, especially to African-American borrowers (ACORN, 2001). 
Williams and Nesiba (1997) examined racial and economic disparities in the home 
mortgage market of St. Joseph County, Indiana. The study focused primarily on three areas 
of importance: (1) an individual look at the community reinvestment performance (including 
types of institutions, local or non-local ownership, the size of the bank, and location of the 
bank), (2) differences in lending activities with low-income and minority neighborhoods and 
individuals, (3) replicating earlier studies in a moderate-sized urban area as opposed to a 
large area. Data used included HMDA/LAR, census tracts, and lending institution data. A 
three-part analysis was utilized to generate the most accurate results. This included a 
descriptive analysis of the community reinvestment performance, similarities shared by 
lenders (in regards to low-income and minority neighborhoods and individuals) and the use 
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of multivariate logistic regression to examine the probability of a loan being denied. The 
findings suggested that in St. Joseph County, Indiana credit unions and consumer finance 
corporations did more business with low-income and minority neighborhoods and individuals 
than their counterparts, lender characteristics were related to denial rates, out of state lenders 
seemed to be less affected by race and more affected by income, and small locally owned 
banks tend to have lower denial rates than others (Williams & Nesiba, 1997). 
In 2001 Black, Robinson, and Schweitzer reported results from a study investigating 
whether banks with different racial ownership make-ups were more likely to accept 
mortgages from applicants that are of a similar race. Researchers used HMDA and a zip code 
cluster technique developed by R. Clair in 1988 to study this type of phenomenon. Findings 
revealed that Black-owned banks accepted 70.24% of low-income African-American 
applicants compared to 59.47% by White-owned banks. Low-income White applicants were 
four times as likely to be accepted at a Black-owned bank as a White-owned bank when 
compared to Black applicants with similar income. The study concluded that African-
Americans were more likely to receive a loan at an African-American bank while White 
applicants were equally likely to receive a loan regardless of the racial background of the 
bank's owner. 
Based on the literature review the following hypotheses will be examined to meet the 
objectives of this research: 
Hypothesis 1: Minority homeowners are more likely to be victims of subprime 
lending and reverse redlining than non-minority homeowners. 
Hypothesis 2: Homeowners below the area median income are more likely to be 
victims of subprime lending and reverse redlining. 
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Hypothesis 3: Homeowners with refinance loans are more likely to be victims of a 
subprime lending and reverse redlining than homeowners with home purchase loans. 
Methodology 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
HMDA, as previously stated, was enacted by Congress in 1975 and is implemented 
by the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation C. According to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, (FFŒC, URL) this regulation provides public loan data that can be 
used in three ways: I) in determining whether financial institutions are serving the housing 
needs of their communities; 2) for public officials to use in distributing public-sector 
investments to attract private investment to areas where it is needed; 3) and in identifying 
possible discriminatory lending patterns. This study is concerned primarily with the last area 
of use. 
Included under Regulation C are several types of financial institutions: banks, savings 
associations, credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions. In 2001, 7,713 financial 
institutions reported approximately 19 million loan records for 2000. Using the loan data 
submitted by these financial institutions, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) creates aggregate and disclosure reports for each metropolitan area (MA). 
Loan application registers (LAR) for the Des Moines SMA in Polk County, Iowa were used 
in this study. Over 41,000 loan applications were reported for 2001. 
Variables from the HMDA file used in this study are lenders, type of lending, loan 
type, loan amount, loan purpose, applicant's sex, applicant's race, and applicant's income. 
Proportions of minority population and median household income were added to the data file 
from the 2000 census. A new variable was created identifying each lender as subprime (1) or 
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not subprime (0). A list generated by the National Training and Information Center (NTIC) 
identified lenders for Des Moines, Iowa. Citizens for Community Improvement of Des 
Moines (CCI) supplied the list. For a detailed description of variables and the values of each 
variable, refer to Table 1. 
This study looks only at loan activity in the census tracts for the city of Des Moines. 
A census tract identifies a small, relatively permanent statistical subdivision of an area. 
Partial tracts were eliminated from the data file because HMDA does not specify information 
for partial tracts. There are 47 complete tracts for the city of Des Moines. For the purpose of 
this study only loans originated were studied. This decreased the sample size to 8,297 
households. This number was reduced further to 7,877 due to missing cases for the 
applicant's income. 
Two new variables were created to address tract minority population percentage and 
median income. Based on 2000 census information, the minority population for the city of 
Des Moines was 17.4% and the median income was $38,408. The new variables were 
constructed to determine tracts above or below a designated minority population of 17.4% 
and the median income for the city. Each variable was coded 1 if above minority population 
percent of 17.4% or below median income of $38,408 and if 0 not below minority population 
percentage or above median income. The two census tract variables and the subprime 
variable were combined to create the reverse redlining variable. If a household had a 
subprime loan and was located in a high-minority and low-income tract, it was considered a 
probable source of reverse redlining (Figure 2 and Table 2). Of the loan applicants, 2,522 
were holders of subprime loans, 798 resided in high-minority tracts and 3,641 were located in 
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low-income tracts. When the three variables were combined for the reverse redlined variable 
258 were classified as potentially reverse redlined loan applicants. 
Results 
Descriptive analyses were performed with type of lending crosstabulated by the loan 
amount, loan purpose, race, sex, and household income. Crosstabulations are used primarily 
to show the relationship between two or more categorical variables. The results of these 
analyses can be found in Table 3. 
Higher percentages of subprime loans were used for home purchase and refinancing 
than for home improvement. Since the loan amount is a continuous variable, the amounts 
were collapsed into four categories. The lowest one-fourth loan amounts had the smallest 
percentage of subprime loans, 18%. The other three loan size categories all had about 34-
35% subprime loans. 
Applicants within the highest income bracket had the lowest percentage of subprime 
loans (23%), while those in the lowest income category had the highest percentage of 
subprime loans (34%). 
Gender did not yield a difference between subprime and not subprime lending, except 
for the category that included "no information." Race, on the other hand, was a very 
interesting variable when comparing type of lending. Although the percentage of subprime 
loans ranged between 24 and 38%, African-Americans and American Indians had the highest 
subprime percent (38.6 and 38.5%, respectively) and Asians had the lowest percent (24.4). 
Finally, 28% of the applicants with conventional loans had subprime loans, while 51% with 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans and 45% with VA loans had subprime loans. 
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Logistic Regression 
Binomial logit techniques were used to estimate the effects of the selected variables 
on the probability of securing a subprime loan or of being reverse redlined. Logistic 
regression estimates the probability of a certain event occurring. The models work by fitting 
the probability of response to the proportions of the responses observed. 
In the first logistic regression, the dependent variable measures whether one has a 
subprime loan or not. In the second logistic regression the dependent variable measures 
whether one has been reverse redlined or not. The logistic regression output in SPSS 
produces a number of tables. This study reports the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, the omnibus 
tests of model coefficients, the model summary, the classification table, and the statistics of 
individual variables in the equation. 
The first logistic regression used type of lending (subprime/not subprime) as the 
dependent variable. The omnibus test of the first model coefficients includes the model chi-
square. The results of this test on the data used displays a chi-square of 520.604, df=14, and p 
<001 (Table 4). Therefore, the first model is statistically significant. The results of Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test implies that the first model results lead to rejection of the null hypothesis; 
therefore, the model's estimates do not fit the data at an acceptable level. (Table 4). 
The model summary includes three important pieces of information: -2 log likelihood 
(LL), the Cox and Snell R2, and the Nagelkerke R2. According to the -2LL test the model 
does not fit the data very well. It yields a -2LL value of 9051.395. The Cox and Snell R2 and 
the Nagelkerke R2 attempt to imitate the interpretation of the multiple R2. The Nagelkerke's 
R2 is a modification of the Cox and Snell R2 and normally is larger. This study yielded a low 
Cox and Snell R2 value of .064 and a low Nagelkerke R2 value of .091 (Table 4). 
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Based on results in the classification table, the first model correctly predicts that the 
value of the dependent variable is observed in the data 61% of the time (Table 4), with 60.9% 
of prime loans and 61.3% of subprime loans predicted successfully. 
Although the first model for subprime loans does not fit the test well there are six 
applicant variables and specifically seven applicant variable values that yield significant 
results (Table 4). Male and female applicants' probability of receiving a subprime loan both 
decrease when compared to the same probability for those whose gender is unknown. 
African-Americans are more likely to receive a subprime loan when compared to applicants 
whose race is unknown. The probability of receiving a subprime loan for conventional loans 
was lower when compared to VA-guaranteed loans. The result for income indicates that 
applicants with higher incomes have a lower probability of receiving a subprime loan than 
those with lower incomes. Applicants with refinancing loans and those with home 
improvement loans increases the likelihood of receiving subprime loans compared to home 
purchase loans. 
The second logistic regression analysis was performed using reverse redlining as the 
dependent variable (Table 5). The results of the Omnibus tests display a chi-square value of 
250.282, df=14, and p <001. Therefore the overall model for reverse redlining is statistically 
significant. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows a goodness result that is greater than .05 (p = 
.343). This implies that the model's estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. This does not 
necessarily mean that the model explains much of the variance of the dependent variable, but 
however much it does explain is significant statistically. 
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The second model summary yields a -2LL value of 1980.475. This suggests that the 
model does not fit the data very well. The second model yielded a Cox and Snell R2 value of 
.031 and a Nagelkerke R2 value of .127 (Table 5), which are not very high. 
Based on the classification table the second model correctly classifies 69.6% of the 
applicants overall classifying 72.2% of those who are reverse redlined, and 69.6% of the 
borrowers who are not. 
Table 5 also displays variables that have been included in the equation. There are six 
variable values that yield significant results. Loan amount indicates that as the loan amount 
increases the probability of being reverse redlined decreases. African-Americans are more 
likely to be victims of reverse redlining when compared to those whose race is unknown. The 
probability of being reverse redlined using a conventional loan decreases when compared to 
the use of VA-guaranteed loans. Income indicates that applicants with high income have a 
high probability of not being reverse redlined. Refinancing loans results in increased 
likelihood of being reversed redlined compared to home purchase loans. The probability of 
being reverse redlined decreases when using the loan for home improvement compared to 
home purchase loans. 
Conclusion 
The subprime market has grown dramatically. This explosion of loans combined with 
the nearly hyper-segmentation of mortgage lending markets has created opportunities for 
lending abuse. The opportunity for the use of subprime loans within the market, especially 
targeting the less sophisticated homeowners has increased. In this study the probability of 
receiving a subprime loan lies in applicant's sex, race, loan type, income, and loan purpose. 
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All three hypotheses about subprime loans were supported; minorities, low-income, and 
refinancing were significant and related to subprime loans. 
This study also shows the probability of being reverse redlined lies in race, loan 
amount, income, and purpose for the loan. The results of the analysis support the first and 
second hypothesis that income and race are factors in determining the likelihood of being 
reverse redlined. African-Americans and households with low-income compared to 
applicants of unknown race and those with high incomes were among the variables that 
yielded significant results. The third hypothesis was supported in that refinancing had a 
higher likelihood of being reverse redlined than home purchase. 
This study provides an overall understanding of the lending patterns of lenders in the 
city of Des Moines. It provides additional information to contribute to the quality of life for 
individuals and communities by addressing the housing finance of under-served populations, 
which can challenge the current housing policy. Also as a contribution, the research method 
provides a creditable method for measuring reverse redlining that can be shared with policy 
makers and researchers understanding lending practices. The systematic investigation 
illustrated in this research could help federal policy makers, local program administrators, 
and the general population decide how to invest in efforts aimed in addressing problems with 
subprime lending and their potential targeting of neighborhoods identified as low-income 
and/or minority. In addition, HUD could assist local program administrators by producing a 
series of best practice reports to disseminate information about effective strategies for 
preventing or addressing problems with lending institutions. Educating the public about what 
goes on in their community is a good defense to end abusive lending tactics. 
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A major limitation in this study is the missing data. The race of many applicants was 
not included in the HMDA file because they applied by mail or over the telephone. This 
makes it very difficult when making comparisons based on race. Beginning January 2003 
race of all applicants will be required, whether the application is in person, by mail, or over 
the telephone. Another limitation is that the HMDA file does not include enough information 
to detect predatory lending. HMDA should be revised to include the type of loan (fixed, 
ARM, etc.), interest rate, the term, loan fees, applicants' age, and the number of dependents. 
Inclusion of these factors would show the conditions of the loan and allow evaluation of the 
borrower's ability to repay. 
The final limitation in this study is the analysis of only one city. Hopefully, by 
establishing and presenting the methodology to investigate reverse redlining, additional 
studies will follow to further test the concept of reverse redlining. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables Used in Analysis 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Reverse Redlining 1= Reverse Redlining; 0=Not Reverse Redlining 
Subprime Lending 1= Subprime Lending; 0= Not Subprime Lending 
Tract Census Tract Number 
Applicant's Sex 1= Male; 0= Female; 2=Information not provided by 
applicant in mail or telephone application; 3= Not 
Applicable; (2 & 3= Comparison Group) 
Applicant's Race 1= American Indian or Alaskan Native; 2= Asian or 
Pacific Islander; 3= African-American; 4= Hispanic; 
5= White; 6= Other; 7= Information not provided by 
applicant in mail or telephone application; (6 & 7= 
Comparison Group) 
Applicant's Income * 1= $1,000-31,000; 2= $32,000- 46,000; 3= $47,000-
64,000; 4= $65,000- 1,250,000 
Loan Type 1= Conventional (any loan other than FHA, VA, FSA, 
or RHS loans); 2= FHA-insured (Federal Housing 
Administration); 3= VA-guaranteed (Veterans 
Administration); 4= FSA/RHS (Farm Service Agency 
or Rural Housing Service) 
Loan Purpose 1= Refinancing; 2= Home Improvement; 3= Home 
purchase; 4= Multifamily Dwelling 
Loan Amount * 1= $1,000- 44,000; 2= 45,000-69,000; 3= 70,000-
92,000; 4= 93,000- 8,775,000 
High Minority Tract 1= Tracts identified as high minority (greater than 
17.4%); 0= Tracts identified as low minority (less than 
17/4%) 
Low-Income Tract 1= Tracts identified as low-income (less than $38,408); 
0= Tracts identified as high income (greater than 
$38,408) 
* Continuous variable in regression. Collapsed into quartiles for cross tabulations. 
69 
Table 2. Distribution of Variables (Per Tract) 
Census Tract Percent of Subprime Minority Population Median Income 
Loans Percentage 
1.01 29.3% 3.2% $32,188 
1.02 37.3% 3.4% $47,025 
1.03 28.8% 3.9% $35,000 
2.01 33.3% 5.3% $39,125 
2.02 27.5% 4.0% $35,093 
3.00 28.6% 9.7% $32,439 
4.00 30.6% 6.0% $33,665 
5.00 43.2% 14.8% $36,613 
6.00 32.7% 5.6% $36,153 
7.01* 29.3% 22.5% $32,951 
7.03 27.1% 2.6% $47,009 
8.02 26.7% 2.2% $49,512 
8.03 29.2% 3.9% $40,546 
9.01 30.4% 3.3% $45,280 
9.02 29.8% 2.5% $48,875 
10.00 26.9% 6.0% $38,629 
11.00* 42.1% 35.8% $29,375 
12.00* 37.4% 62.0% $26,436 
15.00 28.5% 10.25 $42,353 
17.00* 28.9% 75.8% $26,490 
18.00 49.0% 7.9% $30,573 
19.00 36.3% 4.0% $38,397 
21.00 37.0% 7.2% $35,186 
26.00* 26.2% 52.1% $23,472 
27.00* 29.3% 39.1% $23,256 
28.00 20.9% 5.7% $40,362 
29.00 27.8% 7.5% $33,620 
30.01 17.5% 2.2% $48,750 
31.00 27.3% 1.3% $67,917 
32.00 29.5% 2.1% $61,809 
39.00 30.8% 12.6% $42,088 
40.01 31.5% 4.7% $46,368 
40.02 27.9% 4.8% $76,467 
41.00 31.2% 3.0% $46,563 
42.00 23.0% 8.7% $27,414 
43.00 28.8% 4.8% $40,716 
44.00 25.3% 9.4% $37,448 
45.01 28.0% 8.0% $45,969 
45.02 22.0% 4.9% $35,145 
46.01 30.7% 3.6% $42,391 
46.02 30.4% 6.4% $33,591 
48.00* 31.0% 28.0% $28,333 
49.00* 16.7% 35.7% $26,849 
50.00* 36.0% 67.1% $22,711 
51.00 27.8% 6.8% $16,875 
52.00* 37.8% 19.8% $22,173 
53.00 30.4% 7.7% $38,438 
* Those identified as having a higher probability of being reverse redlined-
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Table 3. Crosstabulations of Variables 
Purpose Not Subprime Subprime 
Refinancing 67.4% 32.6% 
Home Improvement 92.5% 7.5% 
Home Purchase 65.2% 34.8% 
Loan Amount Not Subprime Subprime 
$1,000-44,000 82.4% 17.6% 
$45,000-69,000 64.5% 35.5% 
$70,000-92,000 65.8% 34.2% 
$93,000-8,775,000 65.9% 34.1% 
Income Not Subprime Subprime 
$1,000-31,000 66.1% 33.9% 
$32,000-46,000 67.8% 32.2% 
$47,000-64,000 70.3% 29.7% 
$65,000-1,250,000 77.0% 23.0% 
Applicant's Sex Not Subprime Subprime 
Male 69.9% 30.1%7 
Female 68.8% 31.2% 
Information not provided by 70.4% 29.6% 
applicant in mail or telephone 
Applicant's Race Not Subprime Subprime 
American Indian or Alaskan 61.5% 38.5% 
Native 
Asian or Pacific Islander 75.6% 24.4% 
African-American 61.4% 38.6% 
Hispanic 67.3% 32.7% 
White 69.3% 30.75 
Other 73.8% 26.3% 
Information not provided by 71.6% 28.4% 
applicant in mail or telephone 
Loan Type Not Subprime Subprime 
Conventional 72.4% 27.6% 
FHA-Insured 49.4% 50.6% 
VA-Guaranteed 54.6% 45.4% 
Note: Column totals=100% 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression (Classification of Loan as Subprime/Not Subprime) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 520.604 14 <001 
Block 520.604 14 <001 
Model 520.604 14 <001 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 32.671 8 <001 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 9051.395 .064 .091 
Classification Table 
Type of Lending Not Subprime Subprime Percentage 
Correct 
Not Subprime 3377 2167 60.9 
Subprime 902 1431 61.3 
Overall Percentage 61.0 
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Table 4 (Continued). 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
Applicant's Sex 11.940 2 .003* 
Male -.496 .148 11.292 1 .001* 
Female -.515 .151 11.643 1 .001* 
Loan Amount .001 .000 1.870 1 .171 
Applicant's Race 13.558 .035* 
American Indian or .253 .596 .180 1 .671 
Alaskan Native 
Asian or Pacific Islander -.014 .221 .004 I .950 
African-American .627 .194 10.474 1 .001* 
Hispanic .263 .201 1.7000 I .192 
White .253 .132 3.699 I .054 
Other -.006 .284 .000 1 .984 
Type of Loan 125.030 <001* 
Conventional -.694 .215 10.420 1 .001* 
FHA-insured .234 .222 1.107 1 .293 
Applicant's Income -.005 .001 33.119 1 <001* 
Purpose of the Loan 168.743 <001* 
Refinancing .163 .061 7.152 1 .007* 
Home Improvement -1.546 .139 123.638 1 <001* 
Constant .160 .227 .495 1 .482 
* Significant at the p< .05 level 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression (Classification of Loan as Reverse Redline/Not Reverse Redline) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 250.282 14 <001 
Block 250.282 14 <.001 
Model 250.282 14 <001 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 8.988 8 .343 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell Nagelkerke 
R Square R Square 
1 1980.475 .031 .127 
Classification Table 
Redornot Not Reverse Redlined Reverse Redlined Percentage 
Correct 
Not Reverse 5304 2321 69.6 
Redlined 
Reverse Redlined 70 182 72.2 
Overall Percentage 69.6 
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Table 5 (Continued). 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
Applicant's Sex .906 2 .636 
Male -.308 .329 .879 1 .349 
Female -.255 .335 .577 1 .447 
Loan Amount -.017 .003 41.059 1 <001* 
Applicant's Race 115.513 <001* 
American Indian or -4.259 10.016 .181 1 .671 
Alaskan Native 
Asian or Pacific .130 .468 .077 1 .781 
Islander 
African-American 1.629 .344 22.401 1 <001* 
Hispanic .314 .420 .557 1 .455 
White -.560 .304 3.396 1 .065 
Other -.541 .765 .501 1 .476 
Type of Loan 5.535 .063 
Conventional -1.079 .504 4.580 1 .032* 
FHA-insured -.761 .530 2.064 1 .151 
Applicant's Income -.014 .003 16.167 1 <001* 
Purpose of the Loan 45.163 <001* 
Refinancing .452 .173 6.806 1 .009* 
Home -1.685 .368 20.915 1 <001* 
Improvement 
Constant -.374 .554 .456 1 .500 
* Significant at the p< .05 level 
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198 Subprime Loan Originations made in Des Moines in 1994 
* = 1 subprime loan 
1,903 Subprime Loan Originations made in Des Moines in 1999 
* = 1 subprime loan 
Figure 1. Subprime Loan Originations made in Des Moines in 1994 and 1999 
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CHAPTER 4. Exploring Predatory Lending in Middle America 
A paper to be submitted to the 
Journal of the American Association of Family and Consumer Sciences 
Thessalenuere Hinnant-Bernard and Sue R. Crull1 
Abstract 
In this research endeavor, the impact of predatory lending and discriminatory 
marketing techniques are examined through a qualitative review of data files. Citizens for 
Community Improvement (CCI) assembled the data files from interviews with homeowners 
regarding their concerns about their mortgages in response to an announcement of Fannie 
Mae's Anti-Predatory Lending Initiative. Qualitative data from the files of the 27 
homeowners at the CCI office in Des Moines, Iowa were examined. Six complaint files from 
the Iowa Attorney General's office supplied data to highlight the activities of abusive 
contract sales. Repeated phone calls were the primary marketing strategy used by predatory 
lenders and contract sellers. The data suggest that educating the public about predatory 
lending tactics is a key component to combat negative aspects associated with home loans or 
contracts. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to explore the impact of predatory lending and 
discriminatory lending practices in Middle America, Des Moines, Iowa. The objective is to 
determine the marketing techniques employed by predatory lenders and examine the 
characteristics and concerns of households who believe that they may be victims of predatory 
1 Graduate Student and Associate Professor, Department of Human Development and Family Studies, Iowa 
State University. 
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loans or contracts. This qualitative approach using homeowner files, which include their 
experiences written in their words, allows the practices of predatory lending to emerge 
through the voices of the victims. 
Predatory lending has become a serious problem for many homeowners and potential 
homeowners in the United States. Predatory lending is a combination of unfair or abusive 
loan terms, unscrupulous and misleading marketing, and high pressure lending tactics that 
limit information or choices available to a consumer (Davis, 2000). It is of great concern 
locally and nationally. For example, locally Citizens for Community Improvement (CCI) and 
Conseco Finance Corporation agreed to a new lending program that should help staunch 
predatory home mortgage loans in the state of Iowa (Dinnen, February 2, 2002). The new 
program seeks to set standards for legitimate subprime loans. Conseco had been previously 
charged with crafting many of its loans in ways that were detrimental to borrowers. In 1999 
Conseco made 2,700 subprime mortgage loans in Iowa. Nationally, the Bush administration 
also launched the credit watch program to provide additional protection for homebuyers to 
help curb predatory lending (US HUD, August 2002). With this program HUD has the 
authority to bar lenders from issuing FHA-insured mortgages if their default and claim rates 
on average exceed the national default and claim rate (US HUD, August 2002). 
Predatory Lending 
The expansion in lending initiatives has created unprecedented opportunities for 
ownership among low- to moderate-income (LMI) families, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
other populations once excluded from the nation's mainstream housing finance system 
(Wyly, Cooke, Hammel, & Hudson, 2001). This increased activity also provides predatory 
lenders with opportunities to take advantage of those considered less sophisticated. Predatory 
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lending is a collection of abusive practices that are made with malicious intent of gaining 
resources from others. Common predatory lending practices include, but are not limited to, 
solicitations of targeted neighborhoods (repeated phone calls, mail solicitations, etc.), high 
interest rates (rates not justified by risk), balloon payments (most of principal is stilled owed 
at end of loan), flipping (repeated refinancing), and asset based lending (lending with 
disregard to borrower's ability to repay). 
"Predatory and abusive practices by mortgage lenders and brokers, which impose 
excessive and unreasonable charges on homeowners, are pervasive and cause serious harm. 
The American dream of homeownership is jeopardized or denied by these pernicious 
practices" (Sturdevant & Brennan, Jr., 2000, p. 1). The practices undermine the stability of 
the neighborhoods where the loans are made. A major effect of predatory lending is rapid 
turnover of property and ultimately an increase in vacant housing structures. This affects 
property values and strips wealth from communities that can least afford to lose it (Davis, 
2000). Vacant places become public nuisances as they become places where children play, 
squatters inhibit, and particularly places where criminal activity takes place. Predatory 
lenders abuse families until they can no longer meet their housing expenses. Predatory 
lending also leads to a high volume of foreclosures, which are costly to the holder of the 
mortgage. Each time a foreclosure takes place a family is displaced. 
Predatory lending practices raise serious issues about fair housing and fair lending 
concerns, largely because banks and their mortgage and /or finance company subsidiaries 
appear to be representing the market and targeting minority communities for higher priced, 
lower quality products (Housing Ohio). There remains strong concern that lending 
discrimination persists, even after years of scrutiny (Courchane, Nebhut, & Nickerson, 2000). 
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Predatory lending violates the fair housing act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
of 1972. Specifically, predatory lending targets minority households which is a violation of 
their protected class (Housing Ohio).The Fair housing Act of 1968 "requires equal treatment 
in terms and conditions of housing opportunities and credit regardless of race, religion, color, 
national origin, family status, or disability" (Bradley & Skillern, 2000, p. 5). The act has been 
amended now to include sex. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1972 requires equal 
treatment in loan terms and availability of credit for all the previously listed categories as 
well as age, sex and marital status (Bradley & Skillern, 2000). 
Fair Credit Reporting 
Recent changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) have been linked to the 
explosion in direct mail advertising and telemarketing by home equity lenders. The FCRA 
(public law 91-508) was enacted in 1971 to ensure that credit reporting agencies provide 
creditors with accurate, up to date information regarding one's credit history, and to ensure 
that this information is used only for permissible purposes. Credit covered by the FCRA 
includes personal, family, credit, household credit, and insurance. Identity, employment, 
credit history, and public record information are included as well. The FCRA sets forth legal 
standards governing the collection, use, and communication of credit data and certain other 
information about consumers (Federal Trade Commission, 2000). 
In 1996, changes made under the act allowed lenders to offer pre-approved loans to 
lists of prospective customers obtained from credit bureaus (The case against predatory 
lending, URL). Many organizations discussing predatory lending make statements about 
aggressive marketing and advertisement techniques offering pre-approved loans and other 
products, but no formal research was found. According to CCI, (URL) predatory lenders 
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aggressively market their loan products through mailings, telephone sales, door-to-door and 
partnering with home improvement contractors. Predatory lenders are lurking in areas where 
borrowers have traditionally found it difficult to obtain financing, now these households are 
routinely exposed to expensive and dangerous loans. 
Fair Housing 
The most frequently used concept related to predatory lending and fair housing is 
redlining. Predatory lending is known as reverse redlining (Reverse redlining, 1993). 
Redlining refers to a practice in which the extension of credit is limited in targeted areas 
usually minority or low-income neighborhoods. Racial redlining encompasses the direct 
refusal to lend in minority neighborhoods that also includes procedures that discourage 
mortgage loan applicants from minority areas. Mortgage lenders figuratively draw a red line 
around minority neighborhoods and refuse to make mortgage loans available inside the red 
lined area (Brown and Bennington, 1993). 
"in direct economic terms, racial redlining reduces housing finance options for 
borrowers in minority neighborhoods and weakens competition in the mortgage market. This 
often results in higher mortgage costs and less favorable mortgage loan terms. More subtly, 
racial redlining discourages minorities from pursuing home ownership opportunities and in 
the broadest sense further entrenches the debilitating sociological effects of racial 
discrimination" (Brown & Bennington, 1993). 
Reverse redlining specifically targets the minority or low-income 
neighborhoods to extend loans with predatory characteristics. Neighborhoods 
that had previously been ignored (redlined) are now experiencing active 
recruitment for home loans, equity loans, and contracts. "Increasingly, sub-
prime lending is becoming the only option of all too many low-income and 
minority borrowers. This reality sadly documents the continued existence of 
the race line in America and the continued existence of the dual lending 
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market in the United States. Whereas before, African Americans were openly 
denied access to credit, today the "race tax" is more sophisticated, more costly 
— and equally exploitative. Where once redlining undermined communities, 
today "reverse redlining" has become the norm and threatens to undermine 
our communities' economies, social services, and tax base. Sadly, an analogy 
to racial profiling is appropriate here. We have all become familiar with the 
term "Driving While Black." Sub-prime predatory lending has become the 
equivalent of "Borrowing While Black" United States Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (2001). 
Contract Real Estate Sales 
Contract real estate sales can also include predatory lending practices. A contract real 
estate sale is a purchasing method that does not use third party financing through a bank or 
other financial lending institution. The seller and the buyer are the only two parties involved. 
The seller has a legal title that means the seller legitimately holds the title to the home until 
the buyer completes the purchase. The buyer holds an equitable title that recognizes that the 
buyer has the authority to have the title transferred to him/herself upon completion of the 
contract. 
According to literature from Citizens for Community Improvement (CCI) of Des 
Moines redlining has been attributed to the origination of predatory contract real estate sales 
(CCI). Knowing that banks would not lend to particular areas opened up the market of selling 
houses on contract, thus reverse redlining. Abusive contract sales are detrimental to 
homeowners and their stability in the same way as predatory mortgages and equity loans. 
Social Conflict Theory 
Most research on the topic of predatory lending has occurred at the grassroots local 
level without much consideration its theoretical underpinnings or its examination in a broader 
societal context. It is possible however, to explain predatory lending in terms of social 
conflict theory. Taking a more theoretical approach than previous research on this topic, 
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contributes to a better understanding of both the process-tactics-used in predatory lending as 
well as revealing solutions-strategies-for its eradication. 
The basic premise of social conflict theory is that society is in a constant state of 
disagreement with only temporary periods of stability. The major constructs of social conflict 
theory are power, coercion, authority, and stratification. Power refers to the ability to get 
others to do what you want even against their will. Power is legitimate because it is 
sanctioned by social norms (Farrington & Chertok, 1993). "... theorists are interested in how 
society's institutions- including the family, government, religion, education, and the media-
may help to maintain the privileges of some groups and keep others in subservient positions" 
(Schaefer, 2002, p. 15). The theoretical emphasis is on the distribution of power in any social 
group, organization, or society (Kammeyer, Ritzer, & Yetman, 1994). 
Conflict is natural (Spencer, 1989). In this theoretical framework, incumbents, those 
with greater power and resources are engaged in a continuous struggle with those with fewer 
resources. Thus conflict exists because individuals are motivated to act in accordance with 
their own interests (Farrington & Chertok, 1993). Those victimized, however, may form 
alliances. In social conflict theory, conflict can increase internal cohesion among community 
members and community advocates. 
As the name implies predatory lenders prey on homeowners' equity and attempt to 
take control of resources. Homeowners are also interested in building equity and maintaining 
control of their neighborhoods. They share a common interest in controlling resources, which 
is where the conflict occurs. The dominant group, in predatory lending, is the lenders and the 
weaker group is the unaware homeowners. The homeowners are approached by persons to 
whom they can relate; persons who are friendly, well educated, and appear to instilled with 
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nothing but good intentions, tn this scenario, the predatory lender seeks only to make a profit 
as the expense of the homeowner. Made aware of the activity of unscrupulous predatory 
lenders, however, victimized homeowners can coalesce and organize to minimize or 
eliminate these practices. Since conflict has the ability to bring people together, community 
advocates are likely to arise that are willing to fight the common enemy. This can be a 
blueprint for what communities and advocates for healthy communities. 
Methodology 
Two recent activities in the state of Iowa, the second specifically in Des Moines, have 
contributed to the availability of qualitative data for this study. The first is legislation passed 
in the state in 2002 which was proposed by the Attorney General's office to regulate contract 
sales. This proposal was the result of numerous complaints received by the Iowa Attorney 
General. Personnel from the Attorney General's office estimated that they received about 40 
complaints annually on contract sales (L. Ludwig, personal communication, November 15, 
2002). Per the request of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Iowa Attorney General's 
office supplied six recent complaint files regarding abusive contract real estate sales. 
The second activity is a partnership formed between CCI in Des Moines and the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). The National Training and 
Information Center (NTIC) from six states partnered with the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) in July 2000 to support local organizing on predatory lending. 
Fannie Mae piloted the program in Chicago where it announced plans to buy $5 million of 
refinancing loans to help predatory lending victims in Chicago. The loans are available to 
people who make less than 80% of the area's median income for single-family homes and 
two-flats (Fannie Mae). A similar initiative is available through CCI in Des Moines (Des 
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Moines, Iowa). On February 22, 2002 Fannie Mae, CCI of Des Moines, local banks, and 
attorneys announced an innovative anti-predatory lending refinance initiative to help Des 
Moines homeowners obtain responsible mortgage loans (Dinnen, February 23, 2002). Shortly 
after the refinance initiative was announced in the local paper (Dinnen, February 23, 2002), 
homeowners began calling and coming to CCI. CCI supplied the files of 27 homeowners 
seeking assistance through the refinance initiative. 
The files provided by the Attorney General's office and by CCI serve as the data for 
this qualitative study. By using the files of homeowners who describe their lending 
experiences in their own words, the voices of the victims express the impact of predatory 
practices. Through the voices, illustrations and patterns of the many faces of predatory 
lending emerge. 
Contracts Sales Complaints and Related Legal Reform 
Prior to the recent legislation passed in Iowa (House File 2565, West's No. 136) 
contract sales did not require appraisals, credit checks of purchaser, inspections, escrow, or 
title searches. According to an article in the Des Moines Register, characteristics of contract 
real estate sales include: overpriced houses, poor quality of houses, liens, unpaid taxes, 
balloon payments, high interest rates, high down payment, and in some cases condemned 
houses are sold ("Review finds", 2001). 
A complaint filed with the Attorney General's office illustrates the quality of the 
house and how the seller handled roof repair: 
"The original contract states that will supply the materials to replace the roof 
on the said property. In March '99 we received a letter from stating that we had 
30 days to replace the roof on the said property or he would proceed with 
foreclosure. He continued to verbally threaten to foreclose on the house if the work 
was not completed by his immediate deadline. We were summoned to the home of 
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for a meeting stating that he wanted us to get a mortgage on the house because he 
didn 7 want to be out hanging for the next 15 years. " (Homeowners- AG's File) 
As of April 1, 2002 there were 166 houses on the active public nuisance list for the 
city of Des Moines. Of those houses, 49% were involved in contract sales (Citizens for 
Community Improvement, Des Moines). Since 1998, Des Moines has had over 2,629 
unregulated contract real estate sales according to literature distributed by CCI. A typical 
story was printed in a CCI flyer: 
"I always figured my credit was too bad to own a home, so Ijumped at the chance to 
buy a house on contract. What a mistake. The house they sold me was $48,000 turned 
out to be $55,000 at 14% interest when I went to sign the final papers. IVhen I got my 
first water bill for $400,1found out there was a water leak under the house. Then the 
furnace they said was nearly new stopped working and I had to put my kids in a 
shelter temporarily. With all the extra costs, I eventually fell behind on my payment. 
That's when the contract holder served me a 30-day notice to vacate. All my savings 
went into the house. What is my family supposed to do now? " (CCI, 2001) 
In 2002, the state of Iowa passed a law that required sellers to disclosure more 
information for buyers of contract real estate sales. The law only applies to those who sell 
four or more houses on contract a year and excludes bankers and others already subject to 
disclosure laws (Rodd, February, 2002). The law consists primarily of three sections: 
disclosure statement, penalty, and civil liberties. The law requires that contract sellers 
disclose information regarding liens, unpaid real estate taxes and the assessed value of the 
house. A homeowner's complaint regarding taxes was given to the Attorney General's office: 
"When I purchased this house, there were back taxes owed. said I had to pay 
after March 2000. They still have not paid the prior taxes. " (Homeowner- AG's File) 
Another requirement is that a contract seller, who intentionally provides false 
information or does not use reasonable care to determine accuracy, will be charged with 
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fraudulent practice in the 5th degree (simple misdemeanor). The following homeowners were 
refused copies of the documents used for their transaction with the contract seller: 
"We went to office to attempt to get signed copies of our contract with 
them. But they refused to give us the rest of the signed copies under the grounds that 
is was a legal matter, even to the point where we were kicked out of their office, 
informed that we were trespassing, and the police would be called if we didn V leave 
and never come back. " (Homeowner- AG s File) 
The law also states that a contract buyer found to have been discriminated against 
may within a year bring an equitable action to rescind the contract and award restitution. The 
law requires that real estate contract sales must be recorded in 45 days as opposed to the prior 
law of 180 days. 
The CCI Fannie Mae Initiative and Interested Homeowners 
The S3 million initiative is designed to provide relief to borrowers who have been 
victims of predatory lending. Fannie Mae plans to assist lenders in refinancing homeowners 
out of predatory loans or land contracts made under recognized predatory lending practices. 
This initiative is part of the Predatory Lending Intervention and Prevention Project (PLIPP) 
sponsored by NTIC and Fannie Mae. Included in the following sections are excerpts allowing 
the homeowners to speak candidly about their experiences with predatory loans and contract 
sales. 
Des Moines CCI is responsible for identifying borrowers in need of assistance and 
also provides one-on-one counseling, and post-closing counseling including six months client 
follow-up required for all mortgages. CCI is interviewing homeowners who come to the 
agency for assistance. The procedure used by CCI is outlined below: 
1. Homeowner contacts CCI for interview 
2. CCI conducts interview with homeowner regarding their mortgage situation 
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3. CCI reviews homeowner situation- makes a decision regarding loan; pre-
purchase counseling/ education 
4. Legal advocate partner may negotiate down the terms of original loan 
5. Loan committee reviews loan files monthly 
6. Lender underwrites/ originates loan 
7. Fannie Mae purchases the loan 
8. CCI provides post-purchase/ early delinquency counseling 
The data for this study are comprised of information gathered during step 2 listed in 
the CCI procedure above. This purposive sample is used to study the details of predatory 
lending practices. The respondents self-selected themselves as homeowners in trouble and 
possibly victims of predatory loans. It should be noted that not all interested persons seeking 
interviews with CCI of Des Moines were eligible for the lending refinance initiative. 
Following the news release in February of 2002 about the refinance initiative, over 
100 interested homeowners contacted CCI of Des Moines. These homeowners brought 
documentation of their loans with them to the interview so a complete assessment could be 
made. At the time of this study, 27 homeowners had made appointments and had been 
interviewed by Tyler Uetz of CCI. Some homeowners submitted written accounts of their 
interaction with lenders. These accounts are used to depict the experiences homeowners have 
had with financial institutions. 
Homeowners were interviewed using the "Foreclosure Intake Questionnaire and the 
Document Review Checklist" provided by Fannie Mae to identify predatory loans. Some of 
the pertinent questions for this study are as follows: 
• Background Information/ Household Demographics 
- Home Purchase Price? 
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Original mortgage amount? Monthly payments? 
- Current mortgage amounts and monthly payments? 
Property census tract? 
Second mortgage? 
• Credit History 
Before you refinanced your loan, did you stay current on your 
monthly mortgage payments? 
• Mortgage History (how many times refinanced, loan amount, lender) 
- Reason for refinancing (i.e. home repairs, pay taxes, pay other bills, 
lower monthly payment)? 
How did you come to contact the repair company (i.e. response to mail 
solicitations, door-to-door solicitation, phone call)? 
How did you come to contact the specific lender/broker (i.e. contractor 
referral, referral from a friend/relative, mail solicitation, phone 
solicitation, door-to-door solicitation)? 
Interaction with lender? 
As a result of the refinancing, did your payments increase or decrease 
from your previous mortgage payments? By how much? 
Information from Homeowners Interviewed by CCI 
Although the interviews were conducted by CCI of Des Moines, the files void of 
names and street addresses were available for this study under the human subject guidelines 
of Iowa State University. Among the 27 homeowners, 20 were White and 7 were African 
American (Table I). Seventeen of the households consisted of married couples. The 
homeowners ranged in age from the early 30's to the late 70's.Ten of the homeowners 
interviewed were female. The household size ranged from 1-10 persons (Table 2) with 
household incomes from $6,408 to $76,308 per year. As noted, predatory lending has 
stretched far beyond the confines of the city of Des Moines. Of the 27 homeowners, 19 reside 
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in Des Moines, while 8 resided in surrounding areas including Altoona, Urbandale, and 
Greenfield. 
The initial purchase price of the 27 houses ranged from $10,000 to $ 170,000. 
Estimates of current house worth ranged from $31,000 to $152,000. The current loans range 
from $21,700 to $157,000 with interest rates of 6.5%-15.43%. Three of the homes had loans 
higher than the current worth value. 
The homeowners were asked questions regarding additional debt. Of those who 
answered this question 18 reported having additional debt. Examples of this additional debt 
include car loan, credit cards, medical bills, and personal loans. This led to a series of 
questions about bankruptcy. Twelve homeowners reported having filed bankruptcy 
previously and another 12 reported that their mortgages were not current (Table 2). 
Twenty-five respondents refinanced their original mortgage at least once (Table 3). 
The loan amounts were between $12,662-114,900 and 16 received money from the 
transaction. There were several types of loan terms but three were most frequently cited: 
ARM 30 years, fixed 30 years, and a 15 year balloon (Table 3). Over one half of the 
respondents experienced an increase in monthly payments. Several homeowners reported that 
their house was in the process of foreclosure while only three received financial services 
from the same original and current lender. 
Marketing Techniques Used in Predatory Lending 
A major interest of this paper is the marketing techniques employed by the lenders. A 
breakdown of the marketing techniques reveal that eleven homeowners were contacted by 
phone, nine were contacted by mail, six were referred to the lenders, two saw advertisements 
on television, one found the lender in the phone book, and one homeowner's initial contact 
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was arranged by a contractor. There were some homeowners with overlapping marketing 
techniques. Based on information in table 3, the most frequently utilized techniques were 
repeated phone calls, mail solicitations and referrals from friends, brokers, and financial 
institutions (Table 3). 
Victims of predatory lending frequently describe being subjected to a flood of phone 
calls and letters from brokers and lenders, encouraging them to take out a home equity loan 
(The case against predatory lending, URL). They also advertise through television 
commercials, highly visible signs in neighborhoods, door to door solicitations, and flyers 
stuffed in mailboxes. Many companies deceptively tailor their solicitations to resemble social 
security or other government checks to prompt homeowners to open the envelopes and 
otherwise deceive them about the transaction (Sturdevant & Brennan, Jr., 2000). In the files 
from the Attorney General, one homeowner speaks about a referral received from their 
student loan collector: 
"/« 2000 (my husband) was dealing with a dispute over a guaranteed student loans 
that was being collected upon by the government through . We told them we 
could borrow no money from anywhere to pay off this. referred us to 
. They routinely referred people to mortgage. They would hold off 
on proceedings until they heard if we were approvedfor a loan with or not. " 
(Homeownwer- AG's Office) 
Common predatory lending marketing techniques involve solicitations to targeted 
neighborhoods. Targeted populations consist primarily of elderly, minority, women and/or 
low-to-moderate income homeowners. These households are targeted because the access to 
conventional loans and other financial services is severely disproportionate. It has been 
suggested that elderly populations are usually equity rich and cash poor (Quercia & Rohe, 
1992). One elderly homeowner in the CCI sample is a 65-year old widow with a fixed 
income of less than $18,000 year. She purchased her house five years ago for $130,000. It 
has been refinanced twice and currently she is behind in her mortgage payments. She 
describes her fear of not having enough money: 
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"I'm 65 years old and this is my one and only house I have ever owned at age 61. 
Please, please, please make them eat this loan; otherwise I am going to lose my 
house. My mortgage payment to was $519.13 it had all my taxes, flood 
insurance, and house insurance all in one taken out automatically from checking so 
its never late. The payment to was $597.95 so, 597.95+519.13= 1117.08 a 
month from 1476.24 = 359.16 left. That does not leave enough for car insurance, life 
insurance, gas, electric, food, clothing, phone, cable, newspapers and so on. I'm now 
in a financial bind. " (Homeowner- CCI File) 
Sales Techniques Used in Predatory Lending 
Shifting unsecured debt into mortgages is a tactic used in the sale of the loan. The 
benefits of consolidating bills into mortgage loan are embellished without note of the 
disadvantages. This practice increases the monthly payments and exacerbates the risk that the 
homeowner will lose the home (Sturdevant & Brennan, Jr., 2000). Another sales tactic used 
is commonly referred to as bait and switch. Bait and switch simply means that a lender offers 
one set of loan terms when the borrower applies but pressures the borrower to accept worse 
terms at closing (National People's Action, URL). 
Inaccurate appraisals are of concern also. Borrowing more than the worth of the 
house can cause problems when/if the borrower decides to move and sell the house. A couple 
of the homeowners in this sample have loans that are higher than the current worth value of 
the home. This can be attributed to inaccurate appraisals. One homeowner referred to the 
appraisal as a ''drive by appraisal' (Homeowner- CCI File). Predatory lenders are lending 
more money and being paid more money in return. One homeowner makes over $76,000 
year and currently is in the process of foreclosure. He and his wife tried to refinance their 
loan in an attempt to save their home but found out they would not be able to do so based on 
the appraised value of the house: 
" There were no problems until July/August of1999 when we found out they had no 
intention of refinancing us because we owed more than the house was worth. 
Evidently it was appraised for more than it was worth when we bought it. " 
(Homeowner- CCI File) 
Loan Conditions Used in Predatory Lending 
Predatory lenders charge interest rates well above prime rate and not justified by risk. 
Predatory lenders are able to charge these interest rates (frequently 14%-18%) because 
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subprime borrowers with limited financial resources or knowledge may be relegated to 
finding credit at any price (The case against predatory lending, URL). Padded closing costs 
also are a method of getting additional money. Certain costs and fees are increased above the 
typical costs. One couple shares what they were told about their interest rate and 
consequently what took place: 
"The broker said he had tried every bank in town and coidd not get us financing. 
After a day or so he called back to tell us that he was unable to come up with 
something but the interest rate would be high for a year. After we had made all of our 
payments for a year on time we would be refinanced at a lower and more reasonable 
rate. Our credit was being destroyed, so we decided to sell our home in August 2000 
when the interest rate went from 11.3% to 13.1%. " (Homeowner- CCI File) 
Another common practice associated with the actual loan in a predatory lending 
transaction is the balloon payment. This practice involves setting up a loan so that at the end 
of the loan period the borrower still owes most of the principal amount borrowed. The 
balloon payment is often hidden and is structured to force foreclosure or refinance. 
Many loans are made without regard to the ability to repay. This type of lending is 
known as asset-based lending. Individuals who are equity rich and cash poor are prime 
targets for this tactic. This type of lending is designed to fail. Here is a description of one 
homeowners experience with asset-based lending: 
"...we also did not have enough money for a down payment or closing costs, but we 
were again assured that we could get financed. After visiting with the mortgage 
broker, which turned out to be Mr. X's son, he also assured us that financing would 
not be a problem. " (Homeowner- CCI File) 
Another homeowner questioned whether her income was even factored when she 
applied for the loan: 
"No where does any of these papers show my income. What papers did he turn in to 
them to show income, or did he falsify a paper as to income to the loan 
company? "(Homeowner- CCI File) 
Still some predatory lenders will not take no for an answer. They will tell borrowers 
that there are ways to make the transaction of the loan possible. This homeowner states that 
she and her spouse could not afford the house: 
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"After showing it (the house) to us and then telling us the selling price, I told him it 
was just outside of our budget. He said he would show me a way to adjust my 
withholding exemptions to make better use of our finances. " (Homeowner- CCI File) 
Predatory Techniques Used After the Closing 
Loan flipping is a very common practice that occurs after the loan has been closed. 
Loan flipping involves the successive repeated refinancing of the loan by rolling the balance 
of an existing loan into an unnecessary new loan. There is usually no benefit to the borrower. 
Prepayment Penalties are used to lock borrowers into high interest rates. Borrowers 
are charged huge fees when or if there is a decision to pay off a loan early (or possibly 
refinance into another one). Prepayment penalties are often times unknown to the borrower. 
One homeowner gives a description of how he and his wife discovered they had a 
prepayment penalty: 
"By December Realtor X had sold our home. We knew we could sell it for what we 
owed so we were willing to take out an unsecured loan for S15,000. Everything 
concerning the sale seemed to be going fine until the lender called and told us we 
would have to pay a penalty ofS18,000for paying ojf our loan early. " (Homeowner-
CCI File) 
Abusive collection practices are utilized to make sure that the payments are received. 
Lenders continuously call homeowners at all hours. Some borrowers are contacted prior to 
the grace period. These tactics often involve threats to evict the homeowner immediately, 
even though the lenders know they must first foreclose and follow eviction procedures 
(Sturdevant & Brennan, Jr., 2000). This homeowner illustrates an episode that takes place as 
they attempt to make their mortgage payment: 
"... we made our house payment by mailing them a check each month for §1247.30 
and $330.31 to . Several times during August 1999-September 2000 would 
accuse us of not sending in our payment when we had. Once they called and said if 
we did not overnight them the check it would be counted as bad credit, so we 
overnighted it to them only to have them cash both checks the next day. " 
(Homeowner- CCI File) 
Foreclosure is a very realistic possibility for homeowners with predatory loans. 
Foreclosures affect everyone involved. They are costly to the holder of the mortgage, 
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financially and emotionally. Each time a foreclosure takes place a family is displaced. This 
couple describes foreclosure as their only alternative: 
"This was their final solution to our problem. We were told that we had to sell the 
home or face foreclosure. When it became clear that we had no other choice we 
sought legal counsel and were advised to file for bankruptcy and let the lender 
foreclosure on the home. " (Homeowner- CCI File) 
While many of the loan terms previously mentioned may not be predatory on their 
own, the failure of the lender to fully disclose to the borrower the risk or cost associated with 
each individual term can make the loan package problematic, especially if the borrower is 
unaware that better terms may be available (Housing Ohio, URL). 
Conclusions About Predatory Loans and Contract Sales 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Housing have been set in place to ward off 
discrimination, but as the rules are enforced the act of discrimination reinvents itself and 
returns with the same intent in mind. Homeowners in Des Moines were seeking lower 
interest rates, lower monthly payments, and the opportunity to get ahead. Instead they 
received loans with higher interest rates and monthly payments, in some cases payments that 
doubled in amount causing them to fall further into debt. Complaints from the Attorney 
General's office seem to echo these sentiments. Homeowners are not only paying excessive 
fees and back taxes, but they are paying for houses that are dilapidated and sometimes 
hazardous. 
A purpose of this research is to describe discriminatory lending practices in Des 
Moines, Iowa and determine the primary marketing strategy. A recurring theme from the data 
suggests that loans are made with disregard to the households' ability to repay. Based on the 
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interviews, repeated phone calls were identified as the primary marketing tool followed by 
mail solicitations, and referrals. 
Predatory Lending is readily practiced in Middle America. "Subprime loans now 
constitute about 20% of home loans in Des Moines, said Tyler Uetz, an organizer with Des 
Moines based Citizens for Community Improvement, who estimated that about 10% of these 
mortgages could be classified as predatory" (Dinnen, February 23, 2002). At the time of this 
study no homeowners had received any funding from the Fannie Mae initiative. Uetz said 
that he is currently working with two borrowers and is optimistic that they will be refinanced. 
Borrowers from several lenders have joined CCI to take on the problems they have 
experienced. CCI will be holding meetings with borrowers from these selected lenders in the 
near future. Families and individuals are encouraged to speak out about the abuses they have 
suffered at the hands of their lender or contract seller. 
Limitations for this research study include the sample size and the type of sampling 
technique used. Generalizations can not be made due to the size of the sample and the use of 
purposive sampling. Another limitation is the specifics of the data files. The data files need to 
be more thoroughly and consistently organized. Some files were very specific, including 
demographic, household, and mortgage history while others were not. This, by no means, 
could imply that the study is unimportant. One improvement should include increasing the 
sample size by waiting until the initiative has been "in service" for at least one year. Another 
alternative is to perform a longitudinal analysis of the households entering and exiting the 
program and possibly a six to eight month follow-up to measure the impact of the initiative. 
As for the Attorney General's office it may help to perform a thorough search of more of the 
97 
files and possibly look for overlapping and new themes. As the consumers become wiser the 
abusive lenders become more creative. 
Legal restrictions to prevent predatory lending have been approved in Chicago, 
Massachusetts, New York State, and North Carolina. Thus far, two predatory lending 
companies have been held accountable for their actions. Citigroup, Inc. agreed to repay 
customers $215 million to settle federal charges that a company it acquired manipulated 
people into buying overpriced mortgages and credit insurance (Ho, 2002). About 2 million 
victims will receive cash refunds or reduced loan balances to compensate for their losses. 
Another settlement of $484 million was reached with one of the nation's largest predatory 
mortgage lenders, Household International, Inc. Of the $484 million, Iowa stands to gain 
$1.3 million in direct restitution (Rodd, October, 2002). "'While the record restitution in the 
household case seems huge, the amount pales next to the financial losses of the company's 
victims nationwide" (Rodd, October, 2002, p. 2B). 
This qualitative study illustrates the kind of treatment that homeowners experience 
when seeking assistance from predatory financial institutions or contract sellers in the Des 
Moines area. It also pushes for legislation, education, and outreach to deal with the problem. 
Sorenson (2002) suggested that the best way to fight against abusive lending practices is 
through consumer education. "'This is clearly an area where the lending community and 
community based organizations can partner to help lowans make better financial decisions" 
(p.40P). He continued by stating that having some knowledge of our lender and how he/she 
conducts business are the best defense against those who might prey on unsuspecting 
(Sorensen, 2002, p.40P).Although this study provides limited information, it does give a 
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voice to victims of predatory lending and permits the reader to become aware of predatory 
lenders and how they operate. 
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Table 1. Sociodemographic Profile of Homeowners 
Race Age Sex Marital Status Census Tract Tract Characteristics 
1 White 79 Male Married 21 Low-income, low minority 
2 White 41 Male Married 107.01* 
3 African American 49 Female Married 8,01 Partial 
4 White 58 Male Married 28 High-income, low minority 
5 African American 54 Male Married 104.04* 
6 White Mid 30s Male Married 9601* 
7 White Upper 40s Female Divorced 48** Low-income, high minority 
8 White 48 Male Married 112.01* 
9 White Mid 30s Male Married 105 Partial 
10 African American Mid 30s Male Married 27** Low-income, high minority 
II White Mid 50s Male Married 19 Low-income, low minority 
12 African American 71 Female Married 18 Low-income, low minority 
13 White Mid 40s Female Divorced 53 High-income, low minority 
14 African American 50 Male Single 105 Partial 
15 White Mid 50s Female Single 105 Partial 
16 White Mid 50s Female Divorced 43 High-income, low minority 
17 White Mid 40s Male Married 46.01 High-income, low minority 
18 White 60 Female Widow 19 Low-income, low minority 
19 White Early 40s Male Married 9804* 
20 African American 50 Female Divorced 2.01 High-income, low minority 
21 White 56 Male Married 50** Low-income, high minority 
22 White Early 50s Male Single 107.01* 
23 White Early 30s Male Married 3 Low-income, low minority 
24 White 40 Male Married 106 Partial 
25 White Early 40s Female Married 9703* 
26 White 64 Female Widow 301* 
27 African American Early 60s Male Single 27** Low-income, high minority 
* Reside outside of Des Moines, Iowa 
"Tracts identified as Low-income (< $38,408 median household income for the city), 
High minority (> 17,4% minority population for the city) 
Partial= Tracts that cross the corporate limits of a city 
Table 2. Household Demographics/ Credit History 
HH HH Year Purchase Current mortgage/ Current Include escrow File House Other 
Size Income purchased Price Monthly Interest original/ 
current 
Bankruptcy Worth debt 
1 3 21,600 1966 10,000 76,000/783.95 10.99 Y / N  Y 56,960 Y 
2 10 76,308 1998 159,900 157,000/1,896,59 11.30 Y /Y  Y 152,000 N 
3 4 33,480 1989 50,900 79,5000/ 1,209.57 14.806 Y /N  Y 90,190 Y 
4 9 38,000 1999 77,600 66,228/915.91 *13.39/14.25 Y/N  Y 
5 4 31,176 1990 78,000 114,700/1,015.06 10.10 Y /Y  Y 126,000 Y 
6 6 1997 67,000 74,000/774.12 11.80 Y /N  N 93,500 Y 
7 1 1988 15,000 48,000/451.83 10.38 Y/ Y 54,000 Y 
8 2 36,372 1978 39,900 83,300/ 787.00 10.90 N / N  N 97,000 Y 
9 3 2000 98,000 98,000/1,064,96 12.75 N/N N 115,000 N 
10 1994 28,500 51,500/695.00 15.40 N/N N 64,500 Y 
11 1987 36,000 42,000/432.02 12.0 Y/N 44,440 N 
12 3 12,012 1972 30,000 / 591,00 15.43 N Y 
13 3 30,000 1988 39,000 59,500/649,25 10.75 Y/Y Y 69,525 Y 
14 1 55,744 1996 66,400 85,000/ 800,00 10,50 Y/N N 115,000 Y 
15 1 6,408 1998 40,000 42,250/ 384.90 10.45 /N 60,000 
16 3 17,160 1985 79,200/668.53 11.25 /N Y 68,110 Y 
17 2 1990 57,500 45,000/ 392.00 6.50 Y 
18 1 14,400 2000 61,646 74,250/ 756,14 10.13 /Y Y Y 
19 4 46,000 27,757/308.21 10.50 /Y N Y 
20 3 1987 53,720 67,000/ 9.50 Y/N Y 
21 5 32,172 1984 28,000 63,000/661,29 9.59 Y/N Y 70,000 
22 4 45,180 2001 86,500 69,500/649.20 8.75 Y/Y N 86,500 Y 
23 4 1999 61,000 112,250/1,306.88 *7.5/16.0 Y/N Y 90,000 Y 
24 4 40,000 1996 38,400 76,500/ 699,78 10.50 IY Y 90,000 Y 
25 2 22,572 1985 15,000 21,700/248.55 13.50 Y/Y N 31,000 
26 1 17,712 1997 130,000 143,504/597.95 11.80 /N N 135,000 
27 1 16,536 1965 170,000 38,138/512,00 14.90 Y/N 48,000-
58,000 
Y 
* Two loans 
Table 3. Mortgage History 
Current Lender Original Refinance Times Loan Terms Receive Cash 
Lender Original Refinanced 
1 Greentree Plaza State Bank Yes 3 20 yr. Yes 
2 Associates* No N/A Fixed 18 yr. N/A 
3 Greentree Union Planters Yes 2 15 yr. No 
4 Citifinancial* Commercial Credit Yes 1 15 yr. Yes 
5 Money Store Money Store Yes 5 ARM 30 yr, Yes 
6 Traveler's Bank* Union Planters Yes 1 Fixed 30 yr. Yes 
7 Wisconsin Funding Corp. Midwest Family Lending Yes 1 ARM 30 yr. Yes 
8 NationsCredit* Principal Residential Mortgage Yes 1 15 yr. Balloon Yes 
9 Accred, Home Lenders* Accred, Home Lenders* Yes 1 15 yr. Balloon No 
10 Greentree Contract Sale Yes 15 yr. Balloon No 
11 Ameriquest* First National Yes 1 ARM 30 yr. Yes 
12 Conseco Financial Services* Yes 1 Fixed 20 yr. No 
13 Mortgage One Bank of America Yes ARM 30 yr. No 
14 North America Mortgage Mercantile Yes 1 ARM 30 yr. Yes 
15 NationsCredit* SRS Yes 1 15 yr. Balloon Yes 
16 First Union Home Equity NationsCredit* Yes 1 Fixed 30 yr. Yes 
17 ABN AMRO Mortgage Principal Yes Fixed 15 yr. Yes 
18 lndymac Mortgage Express Yes 1 Fixed 30 yr. 
19 US Bank National United Bank & Trust Yes 1 
Association 
20 Vanguard Corporation GMAC Yes 1 40 yr. 
21 Greentree Norwest Yes 1 Fixed 15 yr. Yes 
22 Saxon Mortgage Saxon Mortgage No N/A ARM 30 yr. N/A 
23 Citifinancial* Centex* Yes Fixed 30 yr. Yes 
24 Equicredit Corporation Mercantile Yes 1 
25 Rescue Mortgage American General Yes I 15 yr. Balloon Yes 
26 Full Compass Lending Firstar Yes 2 Fixed 20 yr. Yes 
27 Citifinancial* Associates* Yes 2 Fixed 17 yr. Yes 
* Identified as subprime lender in Des Moines, Iowa (Based on 2000 HMDA data) 
Table 3 (Continued). 
Mortgage Current? Mortgage Current Before 
Refinancing? 
Payment Change Foreclosure How Contacted By Lender 
1 No Yes Increase Yes Phone 
2 No N/A Increase Yes Referral 
3 Yes Yes Increase No Phone 
4 No Yes Increase Yes Mail/phone 
5 No Yes Increase Yes Phone/TV 
6 Yes Yes Increase No Mail/phone 
7 Yes Yes Increase No Referral 
8 Yes Yes Increase No Mail 
9 Yes N/A Increase No Referral 
10 Yes Yes Increase Yes Phone 
M No Mail 
12 Yes Increase AIT. By contractor 
13 No Increase No Phone Book 
14 No No Increase Yes Phone 
15 No Yes Decrease Mail 
16 Yes Increase Yes Mail 
17 Yes TV 
18 Yes Increase Mail (check) 
19 No Mail 
20 No Increase Mail 
21 No Yes Phone 
22 Yes N/A No change No Referral by Mortgage Company 
23 Yes Yes Increase No Phone 
24 No No Increase Referral by Firstar Bank 
25 Yes Decrease No Referral 
26 No Phone 
27 No Increase No Phone 
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CHAPTERS. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In Middle America, Des Moines, Iowa, and other areas as well, subprime and 
predatory lending are real problems for homeowners, especially minorities and those residing 
in low-income neighborhoods. Through a number of abusive practices, such as high interest 
rates, excessive fees, and misleading terms, predatory lenders lock borrowers into contracts 
designed to cost more and/or lead to financial failure. 
Predatory lending is always abusive. However, subprime lending is not. There are 
legitimate subprime lenders who assist homeowners who would not be eligible to receive a 
loan elsewhere. Subprime loans become predatory when they cross the line between "helping 
and hindering" and exhibit the previously mentioned practices. Predatory lending has been 
and should continue to be the subject of renewed debate and policy attention and especially 
in terms of discriminatory actions. 
Fair housing laws were established to ensure that minorities were being treated fairly. 
Specific to this topic, race is not to be a factor in home lending practices. However, it is 
paradoxical when questions regarding race are not required for applicants applying through 
the mail or by phone. This makes it very difficult to use data from the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) to determine how much, if any, discrimination is occurring; thus 
providing an environment for abusive mortgage lending to prosper. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and Fair Housing have been set in place to ward off discrimination, but as the 
rules are enforced the act of discrimination reinvents itself and returns with the same intent in 
mind. In January 2003, race will be required in HMDA for all forms of mortgage 
applications. 
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The general purpose of this dissertation was to determine the prevalence and impact 
of subprime and predatory lending in a Middle American city. Lending patterns and 
marketing strategies, were also examined. An objective of this study was to determine the 
marketing techniques employed by predatory lenders. Another objective was to examine the 
characteristics of borrowers with subprime loans and victims of predatory loans or contract 
sales. 
The two studies in this dissertation contribute to the understanding of housing 
mortgage lending and discrimination. Each study uses households as the unit of analysis and 
Des Moines, Iowa as the area of study. As shown through the interviews collected by 
Citizens for Community Improvement (CCI), predatory lending stretches beyond the Des 
Moines area. This is a very important topic because housing is a basic need of every family 
and an investment for many families. 
One limitation in this study is the use of relatively small samples in only one city. 
Another is the unexplored or unreported area of marketing strategies used in predatory 
lending in the literature. Sources that do mention marketing have no systematic count of the 
frequency of marketing techniques that are used. A third limitation in this study is the lack of 
theoretical oriented research in the literature. Most research of predatory and subprime 
lending has been performed without theoretical orientation. 
Two theoretical perspectives were used to guide the understanding of subprime and 
predatory lending in this dissertation: General Systems Theory (GST) and Social Conflict 
Theory. Systems theory was used to explain subprime lending, while conflict theory was 
used to explain predatory lending. According to GST each part serves a very useful function 
and contributes to the overall performance of the system. Discriminatory acts occur because 
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parts of society are not functioning in a harmonious manner, thus providing the initiation of 
abusive subprime lending. Social conflict theory emphasizes positions of unequal power that 
may exist in social groups, organizations, or society. The incumbents of these positions, 
those with greater power and resources (the lenders, financial institutions, etc.) and those 
with fewer resources (borrowers, possibly those considered to be less sophisticated) 
according to this theory are engaged in a continuous struggle. Both theories provided insight 
into relevant aspects of how mortgage lending and contract sales can be problematic for 
homeowners and communities. 
By integrating the two theories it is possible to understand the process of producing 
communities grounded in knowledge and equipped with skills useful for fighting abusive 
subprime lending and to alter the system beyond a local community through legislation and 
legal action to help regain stability and fairness in housing finance. 
The first article, a qualitative study, explored subprime lending in the city of Des 
Moines using 2001 HMDA data. These data and 2000 census data were used to identify areas 
of reverse redlining. Reverse redlining refers to specifically targeting those neighborhoods to 
extend loans with predatory characteristics. Demographic characteristics of the tracts were 
studied in relation to the lending patterns of households to explore the concept of reverse 
redlining. The data revealed that African-Americans, low-income applicants, and applicants 
receiving loans for home refinance had a greater probability of becoming victims of reverse 
redlining than others. Also, this article established a logistic regression technique for testing 
the concept of reverse redlining using characteristics of the census tracts to designate areas 
where reverse redlining would occur. Based on the results of the logistic regression, 
households that were reverse redlined were predicted 72.2% of the time. 
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The second article, a qualitative study, discussed predatory lending and 
discriminatory marketing techniques in Des Moines, Iowa. Data generated from interviews 
conducted by CCI for the Fannie Mae/CCI Anti-predatory lending initiative revealed that 
abusive practices are occurring and that many of these predatory loans are designed with the 
intention of failing. The marketing tool used most often was repeated telephone calls 
followed by mail solicitations, and referrals. This article also explored the impact of contract 
real estate sales by reviewing homeowners' complaints filed with the Iowa Attorney 
General's Office. Numerous complaints regarding contract real estate sales suggest that 
abusive contract lending is also thriving in this area. A proposal submitted to the state 
legislature by the Attorney General's office to tighten guidelines for contract sales was 
recently passed into law in Iowa. 
As a contribution, the research in the first article provides a creditable method for 
measuring reverse redlining that can be shared with policy makers and researchers to aid in 
understanding lending practices. The second article provides insight to the kind of treatment 
that homeowners experience when involved with predatory lenders and contract sellers in 
Des Moines, Iowa. 
There are a number of policy implications for this study. The systematic investigation 
illustrated in this research could be replicated to scientifically document concepts and tactics 
used in predatory lending. More rigorous systematic study would help federal policy makers, 
local program administrators, and the general population better understand the predatory 
tactics and help them decide how to invest in efforts aimed in addressing problems with 
predatory lending and their potential targeting of neighborhoods identified as low-income 
and/or minority. In addition, the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
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Development (HUD) could assist local program administrators by producing a series of best 
practice reports to disseminate information about effective strategies for preventing or 
addressing problems with abusive lending tactics. 
Often a push for legislation is the first approach suggested to curtail predatory 
lending. Also alerting the public about what is going on in their community is a good defense 
against abusive lending tactics. However, based on the experiences of the homeowners in 
Des Moines, it appears that education and outreach to help consumers to become 
knowledgeable and to be able to identify and deal with predatory lending practices may be 
the best approach of all to counteract predatory lending. 
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